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ABSTRACT
THE ROADMAP TO IRAQ: HOW 9/11 FACILITATED THE 2003 INVASION
by
Michael L. Shumway

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2022
Under the Supervision of Professor Joe Austin

The attacks of 11 September 2001 not only resulted in retaliatory attacks upon the nation
of Afghanistan for its harboring of the terror cell al Qaeda but also for the later U.S. invasion of
Iraq in 2003. Although initial intelligence connected the terrorist group al Qaeda to the attacks,
Bush’s administration officials began assembling intelligence on Iraq’s weapons capabilities and
its possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In this 2002 National Security Strategy, Bush
announced his administration’s position that the United States would react pre-emptively to
threats against the United States or its global interests. This pre-emptive position opened the door
for the United States to act on the presumed threats that the nation of Iraq posed. The Bush
administration manipulated and misrepresented intelligence about the weapons capabilities of
President Hussein in support of their argument for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Bush
administration acted unilaterally, without the approval of military force by the United Nations,
but with the support of numerous allied nations across the globe. The war ended with a
withdrawal of coalition forces on 15 December 2011 leaving Iraq in a more destabilized position
than when the U.S. invaded eight years earlier. This thesis investigates the role that Bush
administration officials had in leading the nation to war, the complacency of the mainstream
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media in disseminating the rhetoric of the administration, and the reasons that certain allies of the
United States had in joining the fight and what led other longtime allies not to participate.
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Thesis Introduction
I was drawn to the topic of the 2003 invasion of Iraq because it was a factor in my
enlisting in the U.S. Navy Reserve while in college. I was not aware of much of the manipulated
intelligence that the Bush administration used in pushing for the war. Truthfully, I was swayed in
favor of the invasion, largely by the speech of Secretary of State Colin Powell before the United
Nations on 5 February 2003. However, as more information became known about how President
Bush tailored and misrepresented information pertaining to the supposed threat that Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein posed to the United States, I felt like the president conned the citizens
he was supposed to represent. More so, he had sent troops into harm’s way because of this
intelligence. This included friends of mine in the military. A close friend was injured by an
Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Others that I knew were injured or killed in this war. Some
came home with the mental challenges of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Because of
these reasons, I felt compelled to research this topic for my M.A. Thesis to better understand the
truth of the war as best as it can be understood so soon after its beginning and end. I argue that
the attacks of 11 September 2001 facilitated foreign policy changes in the U.S. that opened the
door for a unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003 based upon misrepresented intelligence.
I would like to also note that due to the short period of time that has passed since the
invasion of Iraq, there are inherent limitations with analyzing this invasion. First, although I found
a relatively fair number of sources to compose this thesis, a considerable amount of information
remains classified. Even the primary source documents that I did obtain through the Freedom of
Information Act have been heavily redacted. The use of autobiographies from key members of the
Bush administration and foreign leaders that supported and opposed the military action in Iraq
became key texts in this contemporary historical analysis. However, there is the inherent fact that
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few persons would admit to all of their faults in an autobiography that was written to portray the
author as honorable and not disclosing all questionable foreign policy moves that were made. I do
not write this thesis with the aims of answering all of the questions about the invasion of Iraq in
2003 but instead hope that it serves as a steppingstone for future research as more information
comes to light. I argue that the war in Iraq in 2003 forever impacted U.S. foreign policy and the
impact upon the war on the U.S. hegemon deserves critical analysis from the period of invasion to
the present day through interdisciplinary analysis.
My research into a subsection of military history was somewhat difficult as my university
has not had a military historian on the faculty for a number of years. Luckily, I did have an
advisor who was supportive in my exploration of the topic. In an age where most terrorist threats
come from non-state actors, some readers may inquire about why the topic of military history is
still relevant. The fact is that the threat of an amorphous War on Terror led the United States to
wage war against Afghanistan for harboring the terrorist group al Qaeda that executed the 9/11
attacks and against Iraq for its supposed ties to al Qaeda and possession of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD). However, each of these wars occurred within a geographically bounded
nation state. In each situation, the war against a uniformed enemy was brief and the enemies of
the U.S. military quickly became non-state actors. Even as the United States faces future threats
against terrorists globally, the military works hand-in-hand with the U.S. Department of State in
building working relationships with governments where these threats operate. Also, like
traditional warfare, the War on Terror prompted the U.S. to seek allied states to partner with to
fight the war against non-state actors.
As the United States faces terrorist combatants that do not necessarily represent a nation
state, the face of warfare has changed. Traditional warfare has been replaced by irregular or
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asymmetric warfare and the threat of “catastrophic” WMDs appear more ominous in the hands of
terrorist groups than they did during the Cold War when the U.S.S.R. was the United States’
primary enemy.1 With the U.S. engaged in a War on Terror the manner in which the separate
service branches and the various commands within the branches contributed differently in the
fight against terrorism. For example, the U.S. Navy is responsible for the safety of the seas as
more than ninety-five per cent of the world’s commerce moves across the oceans. It is predicted
that terrorists may hide a WMD in a shipping container aboard one of the commercial vessels.
Additionally, the rate of piracy has increased in recent years and it is a method employed by
terrorist organizations to threaten seafaring while also using coastal waterways to smuggle drugs,
which are used to fund their organizations. 2 These are just a couple of examples depicting the
transformation of the mission of the U.S. military in the twenty-first century.
Historian Brian Brivati, political scientist Julia Buxton, and historian Anthony Seldon
argued in their text on contemporary history that the study of this area of history teeters between
necessary and essential. Since the mid-1990s, the study of the subject has proven itself to be
valuable and quieted detractors that previously questioned its place in academia. Brivati, Buxton,
and Seldon describe the contemporary history period as anything that took place after 1945. It
should be noted that over two decades have passed since their definition was recorded. A
definition that seems more fluid as time progresses defines contemporary history as the period in
which there remain living witnesses that can provide an oral history of events that transpired. By
either definition of the term, the study of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 fits the definition of
contemporary history. Brivati, Buxton, and Seldon stress the value of understanding
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James C. Bradford, A Companion to American Military History (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.,
2010), p. 309.
2 Bradford, A Companion to American Military History, p. 310.
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contemporary history and the importance of what has occurred in the modern age. Although we
do not have access to the entirety of the historical record of the Iraq War, this is the time to begin
evaluating the roots of the war and its effects on nations of the world and the United Nations. 3
The end of this introduction to the discussion of the role that the 9/11 attacks played in
facilitating the invasion of Iraq in 2003 provides an overview of how the rest of the thesis
progresses. The beginning of the first chapter delivers a brief literature review of points not
generally agreed upon by all academics regarding the intelligence at play in the invasion of Iraq,
the impacts and motivations that U.S. allied countries had in supporting or opposing the war, and
the impact of the mass media in the story of Iraq. The first chapter also analyzes the drafting of
President George W. Bush’s foreign policy that enabled the invasion of Iraq, which was based
upon the claim that Iraq was an imminent threat to the United States and worldwide democracy.
This chapter examines the significant break in U.S. foreign policy that enabled President George
W. Bush to invade Iraq. Security Strategies are developed by each presidential administration
that lay out their perception of the role the United States has on the world stage on issues ranging
from economics to terrorism for instance. Also significant is how Bush’s Iraq policy supported
incomplete, faulty, and possibly intentionally distorted intelligence that, the administration
argued, demonstrated President Hussein had possession of WMDs. The discussion of removing
Hussein was well underway by the early 1990s. Although there was a covert plan to oust Hussein
during Desert Storm, it was reportedly not considered a major objective. 4 There was pressure on
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Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton, and Anthony Seldon, The Contemporary History Handbook
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. xv-xxiii,
https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Contemporary_History_Handbook/rmO7AAAAIA
AJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=contemporary+history+handbook&printsec=frontcover.
4 Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Rejects Calls for Efforts to Oust Hussein,” U.S. Rejects Calls for Efforts
to Oust Hussein (Los Angeles Times, December 24, 1998), https://www.latimes.com/archives/laxpm-1998-dec-24-mn-57258-story.html.
4

the Clinton administration by members of the U.S. Congress to oust Hussein by 1998, which was
rejected by individuals from the think tank Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in the
same year, many of those representing PNAC would later serve in the Bush Administration. 5
However, it was not until 28 April 2002 that The New York Times published an article titled
“U.S. envisions blueprint on Iraq including big invasion next year” that publicly signaled the
U.S. plans for invading Iraq as a logical follow-up to Afghanistan. It was also a priority for the
administration to find the connections that showed Iraq was tied to terrorism and specifically the
al Qaeda network. 6 President George W. Bush and his administration tasked the CIA to compose
an up-to-date National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) for Iraq in 2001 to analyze the threat that they
posed in the form of terrorism and WMDs. The NIE was interpreted by the administration as the
proof that they needed against Iraq despite the NIE’s intelligence agents couching the details
with a balanced counternarrative citing the lack of solid current intelligence.7 Finally, chapter
one will also investigate the soft power of United States hegemony over the years and how soft
power influenced nations before the invasion occurred.
The second chapter analyzes the media’s role in building President George W. Bush’s
rhetoric and support for the military action in Iraq. While President George W. Bush rallied
against terrorists in the Middle East, some U.S. citizens developed a negative, hateful view of
Muslims. Discrimination against Muslims was not uncommon before 9/11. However, the rhetoric

Tyler Marshall, “U.S. Rejects Calls for Efforts to Oust Hussein,” U.S. Rejects Calls for Efforts
to Oust Hussein (Los Angeles Times, December 24, 1998), https://www.latimes.com/archives/laxpm-1998-dec-24-mn-57258-story.html.
6 Alexander G. Nikolaev and Ernest A. Hakanen, Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global
Media Debate (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 2.
7 “The Black Vault,” The Black Vault (2019),
https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/iraqs-continuing-programs-for-weapons-ofmass-destruction-october-2002/.
5
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against Middle Eastern terrorism amplified discrimination and hate. Subsequently, some
Muslim-Americans became victims of hate crimes due to Muslim stereotypes. 8 The media gave
tacit consent for the invasion of Iraq and very little was written in the mainstream media that was
critical of the wartime president or pre-emptive war against the Middle Eastern nation. It is worth
noting that President George W. Bush experienced extremely favorable approval ratings for his
handling of Afghanistan and the plans for Iraq. Between August and November of 2002, polls
conducted by USA Today measured Bush’s public support between fifty-seven and fifty-eight
percent. According to Gallup Polling, this support reached eighty-eight per cent by March 2003.9
Public backing of the invasion of Iraq emboldened President George W. Bush to act unilaterally
in a military sense if he could not get long-standing allied nations to contribute to and legitimize
the mission of deposing Hussein. This chapter will also compare the role of the media in telling
the story of the Vietnam War and what was similar regarding the treatment of embedded
journalists in the Iraq War of 2003.
The third chapter examines how President George W. Bush cobbled together a Coalition
of the Willing and investigates the reasons behind Germany and France’s official opposition to
the pre-emptive war in Iraq. This chapter examines the role the coalition had in unifying the
United States and some of its allies and identifies what other longtime allies chose to rebuke
militarization of the Iraq-U.S. conflict. I ask, what motivated certain countries to support the war
through financial support, access to territories to launch the invasion, and sending troops
alongside the U.S. service members? The support for an invasion of Iraq was considerably less
than the U.S. experienced in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. In the case of Afghanistan,

Mahmoud Eid. “The New Era of Media and Terrorism.” Studies in conflict and terrorism 36,
no. 7 (2013): 609–610.
9 Nikolaev and Hakanen, Leading to the 2003 Iraq War, 3-37.
8
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the terrorists targeted were intolerable, and the events of 9/11 would not go unanswered.
However, the strike against Afghanistan differed from the pre-emptive war planned in Iraq.
Although the mission in Iraq was different than Afghanistan, the problem of getting allies to
commit troops or funds seemed to stem more from the questionable intelligence and the fact that
a pre-emptive war conflicted with the U.N. Charter and international laws that many countries
supported. Furthermore, it is worth considering that Britain chose to support the United States in
a power play to bolster its previously held hegemonic position.
Although Britain and Australia chose to be significant contributors in the coalition, it is
of considerable importance to recognize the United States allies that stood against American
military action in Iraq. The long-time U.S. allies, France and Germany, distanced themselves
from the Coalition of the Willing and the seemingly unavoidable military action. However,
neither country initially took a public stance against the invasion until it became clear that it
impacted their domestic politics and the public approval ratings of leaders Chirac and Schröeder.
President Bush was proactive in attempting to sway these leaders into gaining their support, but
these efforts were ineffective. If there can be one thing identified as a matter of support that
Germany gave the United States, it was the tip of what turned out to be faulty or manipulated
intelligence from an Iraqi defector. Though Germany had doubts about the intelligence source,
the U.S. ran with it as more evidence for Bush’s call to arms against Iraq.
The three chapters will conclude by examining the causes for the invasion of Iraq from the
early years of the administration and why specific key points in the march to war built support for
the invasion. Secondly, it is worth looking at the motivations of Bush’s creation of the Axis of
Evil countries of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea and why the administration chose to attack Iraq and
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not take action against the others. Finally, I will examine the current state of U.S. hegemony and
look at its utilization post-9/11.
The recent end to the war in Iraq on 15 December 2011 has changed the landscape of
international relations and foreign policy between Iraq and the nations that invaded it on 19
March 2003. Finally, the conclusion asks if the doctrine of pre-emptive war has been utilized by
other nations since it was put into action by the U.S. in Iraq in 2003. Without the occurrence of
another country feeling threatened by an opposing government with ties to WMDs, it is hard to
guess how the pre-emption angle might unfold. Should the United States find itself in a similar
situation in the future, as it was following 9/11, the multitude of variables makes it impossible to
assume how a future president and their international partners may respond. Although the act of
pre-emptive war was clearly taken in Iraq in 2003, the difficult relations that the United States had
with other nations as a result of the invasion may give future administrations pause before
following a similar path of military action instead of pursuing diplomatic measures to a greater
degree.

8

Chapter One: A Drastic Shift in U.S. Foreign Policy
Two critical events occurred that facilitated the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the attacks of 11
September 2001 and the creation of the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States.
These two events enabled President George W. Bush and his administration to plan an expansion
of the War on Terror beyond the territorial boundaries of Afghanistan. The retaliatory strikes of
9/11, against those responsible for the attacks, allowed for talk amongst U.S. officials of
targeting Iraq over one year later from the tragic, massive loss of life on U.S. soil. The likes of
such an attack had not been seen in the U.S. since the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 7
December 1941.
The second event that allowed for discussion amongst the Bush administration regarding
the potential targeting of Iraq was the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States that
codified the priorities of the U.S. in matters ranging from economics, trade, foreign policy, and
military action, just to name a handful. In this particular National Security Strategy (NSS), the
Bush administration made it clear that it would take pre-emptive action against terrorists and it
would act unilaterally if necessary. These key points from this National Security Strategy
represented a critical break from previous National Security Strategies by its explicit intent to act
preventatively in Iraq and declare such actions pre-emptive because it faced a potential threat
that must be addressed before the threat of a mushroom cloud appeared in the heartland of the
United States.
The annual National Security Strategy, that the president is tasked by Congress to release,
is important not just for military matters but declares the priorities of the administration both
domestically and regarding foreign relations. The relevant points of this National Security
Strategy for this thesis were the groundwork for the formation of the Bush Doctrine. Although
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the National Security Strategy of 2002 was critical for President George W. Bush’s foreign
policy agenda following the attacks of 9/11, discussion about an ousting of President Hussein of
Iraq existed in policy circles years before President George W. Bush took office on 20 January
2001. When the events of 9/11 occurred, the fear of terrorism altered the psyche of most U.S.
citizens and the Bush administration seized upon this to start working on a plan to target
President Hussein.
Although the Bush administration did not plan to just march into Iraq and depose
Hussein, they utilized the United Nations to submit for a vote on a resolution to the U.N.
Security Council for unfettered access by U.N. weapons inspectors to ensure the disarmament of
the nation, which was ordered by a previous U.N. Security Council resolution following the Gulf
War of 1990-1991. I discuss the motivations that Hussein had for making the weapons
inspections process difficult or impossible. I will review evidence that President George W. Bush
had additional motivations to strike Iraq and depose Hussein in this chapter as well. The
penultimate topic discussed in this chapter is the legality of the invasion of Iraq, using primary
and secondary sources, by former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and legal scholars of
various backgrounds. The final topic examined is the role of the United States as hegemon and
the expectations placed upon it by the international community. I begin by examining the
cleavage the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States and President George W.
Bush’s foreign policy crafting created as a result of the attacks of 11 September 2001.

10

Why the National Security Strategy Matters
In the introduction to this thesis, I discussed why the definition of “pre-emption” evolved
between Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush. However, the idea of a pre-emptive war
against another nation was something unlike the U.S. had participated in or the U.N. had ever
dealt with in the past. The wording of the 2002 National Security Strategy is striking as a piece
of the groundwork for the war in Iraq. First, however, it is crucial to trace the transformation of
U.S. foreign policy in the recent, previous office-holders of the U.S. presidency. The NSS
documents that each president since Ronald Reagan has produced is the result of the GoldwaterNichols Act of 1986. The main objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to reform the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the various military service branches to operate jointly and create clear
objectives in military planning. For approximately four decades before Goldwater-Nichols, the
different branches of the military experienced mission failure and casualties because of a lack of
a defined hierarchy and unified military cohesion. Although some senior military members had
attempted to internally reform the broken system in the past (from 1943 through the early 1980s),
a retiring chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, declared in 1982 that the
system was so dysfunctional that it was now time for Congress to intervene and re-structure the
different service branches. 10
When Congressman William Nichols (D-AL) joined forces with Senator Barry
Goldwater (R-AZ) in 1985, the two congressmen worked together with Congressman Les Aspin
(D-WI) to reform the armed services and review defense reorganization. The overarching goal of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to achieve success in joint operations while also meeting the

James R. Locher, “Has it Worked?: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” Naval War
College Review 54, no. 4 (2001): pp. 95-101, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26393873.
10
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needs of each branch of the military services. However, the means to reach this balance was the
requirement that the president submit an annual national security strategy, beginning in 1987,
which was used to prioritize and fiscally plan for the most important strategic plans of the
administration. The NSS from each administration explicitly stated the priorities of each
presidential team, from defense to economic and humanitarian goals. 11 Although the NSS
documents are considered part of the record of the Executive Branch, they are developed by the
National Security Council (NSC), the Principals Committee (PC), the Policy Coordination
Committee (PCC), and the Deputies Committee. The Deputies Committee is composed of the
National Security Advisor (Chair), the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the
Deputy Secretary of Energy, just to name a handful. 12
President Reagan’s first NSS, “National Security Strategy of the United States,” was
released in January 1987. Although the first NSS covered the specific items proscribed by the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, the area that pertains to this thesis is how it addresses responses to
terrorist actions against the United States and its interests abroad. The NSS lays out how the U.S.
will respond to terrorist actions early on by stating that the U.S. will deal with terrorist threats to
the U.S. and its citizens globally in a manner “short of armed conflict.” 13 President Reagan was
not oblivious to the danger that terrorism posed, as U.S. citizens and U.S. interests abroad were
the victims of state-sponsored terrorist attacks during his presidency. 14 Furthermore, Reagan’s

Locher, “Has it Worked?”, pp. 95-115.
Richard B. Doyle, “The U.S. National Security Strategy: Policy, Process, Problems,” Public
Administration Review 67, no. 4 (2007): pp. 624-629, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15406210.2007.00748.x.
13 Ronald Reagan, “National Security Strategy of the United States, 1987,” National Security
Strategy of the United States, 1987 (1987), p. 4, https://history.defense.gov/HistoricalSources/National-Security-Strategy/.
14 The most significant terrorist attack during the presidency of Ronald Reagan occurred in
Beirut, Lebanon on 23 October 1983. The bombing of a U.S. Marine barracks claimed the lives
11
12
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first NSS states that the U.S. will isolate and build international pressure on states that sponsor
terrorism.
Interestingly, near the end of the first Reagan NSS document, the president stated that
terrorism may sometimes be part of low-intensity conflict. The administration will deter, and
pre-emptively react to trans-national terrorism by addressing subversive attacks. As I have
worked to demonstrate thus far in this thesis, the interpretation of the term pre-emption is vital
when comparing previous NSS documents to the 2002 NSS of President George W. Bush.
President Reagan’s definition of pre-emptive attacks was consistently a reaction to terrorism
through limited scope airstrikes and never involved the invasion of another country or a fullscale war.15
While pre-emptive attacks against terrorist targets under previous U.S. presidents were a
reactionary measure to attacks on U.S. interests, more importantly they were done to prevent
further attacks that were imminent in nature. These pre-emptive attacks were also limited in
nature and prior to the administration of President George W. Bush, they never included the
large-scale use of military force. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the 2002 NSS wrote of
pre-emptive attacks as measures used to prevent a later threat potentially posed by Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein. This new definition of pre-emption, based on the 2002 NSS, would be
described by the Bush administration as a measure to prevent a possible future attack. This is the

of 241 American service members, fifty-eight French soldiers, and six civilians. However, this
was not the first attack in Beirut, as an earlier attack at the U.S. Embassy in April of the same
year resulted in seventeen Marines killed and numerous Lebanese civilians. These two
significant attacks account for the majority of fatalities of service members during the first four
years of the Reagan administration but there were an additional fifty one service members killed
from international terrorism in Reagans first four years in office. For further reading: Michael
Stohl, “Terrorism, States, and State Terrorism: The Reagan Administration in the Middle East,”
Arab Studies Quarterly 9, no. 2 (1987): 162–72. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41857905.
15 Reagan, “National Security Strategy of the United States, 1987,” pp. 1-41.
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key difference between pre-emption as described and used by U.S. presidents that served prior to
George W. Bush.
In President Reagan’s 1988 NSS, how the administration would react to terrorism is
essentially unchanged since the 1987 NSS. However, there is one difference that isn’t a change
in policy towards terrorism but recognizes the importance of the intelligence community in
identifying and reducing threats to the U.S., its citizens, and its interests abroad. A second
modification between the 1987 NSS and the 1988 NSS is the inclusion of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance as a relationship that will address terrorism beyond the
borders of NATO countries. Finally, the 1988 NSS continued the awareness of the 1987 NSS in
identifying the threat of terrorism that both Libya and Iran posed towards worldwide democracy.
Fascinatingly, the 1988 NSS made no mention of pre-emption in any form, even when the
document discusses the U.S. response to terrorism or its prevention. 16
President George H.W. Bush’s 1990 NSS was similar to President Reagan’s 1987 NSS
regarding terrorism and threats to the United States, its citizens, and its interests abroad. The
1990 NSS resurrected the verbiage of the response to terrorism in a manner “short of armed
conflict.”17 There is also an interesting comparison between President George H.W. Bush’s NSS
and his son, President George W. Bush’s NSS. The former’s NSS stated that weapons of mass
destruction and their proliferation are a threat. Still, his response to this threat is that the
administration will build international pressure against these programs. President George H.W.

Ronald Reagan, “National Security Strategy of the United States, 1988,” National Security
Strategy of the United States, 1988 (1988), pp. 1-48, https://history.defense.gov/HistoricalSources/National-Security-Strategy/.
17 George H.W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States 1990,” National Security
Strategy of the United States 1990 (1990), p. 2, https://history.defense.gov/HistoricalSources/National-Security-Strategy/.
16
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Bush clearly stated that the U.S. response to nuclear threats is to use a coalition of nations to
utilize diplomacy to deter such actions. 18 His son, President George W. Bush, stated twelve years
later that the primary reason the Iraq invasion in 2003 must occur was because of the threat that
nuclear weapons posed to the U.S. and the international community. Even setting aside that no
WMDs were found in Iraq following the invasion, it is interesting how the threats of WMDs,
rogue states, and terrorism were handled differently by President George H.W. Bush than by
President George W. Bush in the post-9/11 environment. As an aside, although President George
H.W. Bush declared, after the conclusion of the Cold War, that it was time for a New World
Order, there is no substantial evidence that future U.S. presidents, his son included, subscribed to
this belief.
The 1991 NSS from President George H.W. Bush mirrors the policy of the 1990 NSS on
the issues of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and pre-emption relevant to this thesis. What is
important to consider here is that the 1991 NSS was published after the conclusion of Desert
Storm, and President Hussein had been repelled from his invasion of Kuwait. President Hussein
had proven to the world, and especially to nations like the United States, that he was a threat to
the region and the world. Despite all of this, it is interesting that the U.S. hoped to bolster states
in the region and secure peace while ensuring that Iraq complied with the U.N. inspectors
required by U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. The objective of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 687 was the dismantling of all of Iraq’s nuclear weapons and the cessation of all of
Iraq’s nuclear-related activities. Although the containment of the threat that President Hussein
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posed received an understandable amount of attention in the wake of Desert Storm, a policy of
pre-emption does not exist in the 1991 NSS.19
President George H.W. Bush’s final NSS was released in 1993. From the beginning of
the document, the NSS still prioritized its goals with the memory of Desert Storm fresh in the
administration’s mind. President George H.W. Bush stressed the threat that weapons
proliferation, WMDs, terrorism, and other issues like narcotics posed. The NSS spelled out the
importance that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had on the world in encouraging the 150+
signatories to cease the production of nuclear arms by the U.S. pledging to do the same in a
manner of good faith. The treaty to draw-down nuclear weapons worldwide is one measure of
effective diplomacy that came after recognizing the threat that nuclear arms had in intensifying
the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Furthermore, the NSS recognized the significance of terrorism after the hostage crisis in
Lebanon and terrorism’s ability to destabilize U.S. national security. While this NSS spelled out
a policy of non-concession to terrorists, it also clearly indicated that the administration’s policy
regarding terrorism is to unify the world to isolate and pressure states that sponsor terrorism
economically. What is essential once again is that this NSS did not speak of pre-emptive or
unilateral policies in addressing terrorism or rogue nations. 20
President Bill Clinton’s first NSS, released in 1994, discussed the significance of
terrorism in the modern era, the importance of the cooperation of the intelligence agencies, and
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international cooperation in combatting terrorism, and pointed out the significant threat of
WMDs in the hands of terrorist organizations. There is also a claim in the NSS that Iraq posed a
specific threat as a terrorist nation due to the belief that they had planned to assassinate former
President George H.W. Bush. However, subsequent intelligence disputed Iraq’s role in this plot
despite the proclamations of George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Donald
Rumsfeld, and others.21 The 1994 Clinton NSS doubles down on the policy of containment
against the nations of Iraq and Iran, targeting the leaders of these nations to induce compliance
and change. Despite the belief that Iraq had planned to assassinate a former U.S. president and
the history of violence that President Hussein demonstrated, the official U.S. policy did not
include invoking a regime change or to launch an invasion of the nation of Iraq.22
In President Clinton’s 1995 NSS, the president stated that perpetrators of terrorism are to
be targeted and brought to justice through the cooperation of states and that the U.S. will aid
other states in combatting terrorism. 23 President Clinton’s 1996 NSS noted how legislation
bolstered the federal government's support to law enforcement officers in fighting terrorism
within the borders of the United States. The 1996 NSS once again increased funding for
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intelligence agencies to combat terrorism. The 1996 NSS boasted that the U.S. brought to justice
those responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and that additional nations
cooperated in fighting terrorism globally. Notably, military force was not included as a proper
tool in responding to terrorist threats in this NSS.24 The 1997 NSS had one significant change
regarding terrorism by placing it at the top of the diplomatic agenda. 25 The 1998 NSS noted that
the U.S. signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings to
increase international cooperation in fighting terrorism and bringing terrorists to justice. The
1998 NSS also stated that the U.S. intelligence community was working to bring Osama bin
Laden to justice for the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania that year. As each NSS
was published from the beginning of the document’s conception in 1986, how the U.S. addressed
terror evolved, usually through small, incremental changes.26
The 1999 NSS, developed by the Clinton administration, discussed the limited strikes
against an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan due to overwhelming intelligence that bin
Laden’s group was responsible for the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings. The document stated that
the U.S. response to the bombing attacks was proportionate and carried out because of the
imminent threat the camps and al Qaeda posed to the U.S. and its interests abroad. Also, the
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administration’s policy of containment regarding Iraq continued in this 1999 NSS.27 However, in
the 2000 NSS, one sentence regarding the administration’s policy for Iraq had changed slightly.
Although containment and the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program would continue, President Clinton
stated that the U.S. would support Iraqis seeking to replace or remove the government of
President Hussein to institute peace in the region. 28

The Idea of Ousting Hussein Did Not Begin After 9/11
The most vociferous proponents of removing President Hussein from power would later
serve on the Bush administration in 2000. In an Op-Ed piece in The New York Times dated 30
January 1998, two members of Project for the New American Century (PNAC), William Kristol
and Robert Kagan, wrote that the Clinton administration must remove Saddam Hussein. They
argued that Hussein must never again be allowed to possess WMDs and the only way to ensure
that doesn’t happen is by his forceful removal and the dismantling of his regime from power.
The PNAC authors wrote that the planned targeted missile attacks against Iraq would never be
sufficient in stifling the threat that Hussein posed. They end their article with a warning that if
President Hussein is allowed to remain in power, he will serve as an example that other Middle
East nations can ignore threats by the U.S., which would be dire for the region. 29
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The neoconservatives (Robert Kagan and Bill Kristol) that formed the think tank PNAC
in 1997 demanded, first under President Bill Clinton and later President George W. Bush, that
the U.S. military should oust President Saddam Hussein from power. In PNAC’s first letter to
President Clinton on 26 January 1998, the group argued that diplomacy had failed, and it was
now time for President Hussein to be removed from power by military force and the United
States was the nation to perform this mission. The group sent a second letter to Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. Although the letter to President
Clinton didn’t gain much traction, the letter to the congressmen was part of the legislative change
of the Iraq Liberation Act.30 The neoconservatives Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Kalilzad had
argued for military action in Iraq to depose President Hussein publicly since 1997 when they
published an article in the neoconservative journal the Weekly Standard.31 The neoconservative’s
actions significantly contributed to the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act. The act made it
official U.S. policy to institute democracy in Iraq. 32 Aside from how President Clinton handled
terrorism during his administration, it is worth looking at how the “Defense Planning Guidance,”
developed in 1992 by PNAC contributors Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, spelled
out how President George W. Bush would launch his War on Terror approximately ten years
later.
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Once President George W. Bush took power in 2000, the neoconservatives in his
administration quickly identified the war on terror as the principal goal of the foreseeable future.
At the West Point Military Academy Commencement Ceremony on 1 June 2002, President
George W. Bush delivered his National Security Strategy of the United States. 33 It was in this
speech that the president made mention of his administration’s interpretation of pre-emptive war:
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter
a sufficient threat to our national security…the case for taking anticipatory action
to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. 34
The plan for a pre-emptive attack, as mentioned earlier, would not be like those of
President George W. Bush’s predecessors. Instead, this pre-emptive attack would be akin
to preventive measures of military force in Iraq, as discussed by historian Matthew J.
Flynn.
However, before President George W. Bush gave his address at West Point in 2002,
where he gave clues of pre-emptive action in the War on Terror, PNAC published an open letter
to the president on 20 September 2001. In their letter, PNAC starts by commending the president
for his charge in leading the nation and the world to victory against terrorism. Given that this
letter was published shortly after the 9/11 attacks, these accolades are not surprising. PNAC then
spelled out what they believed was necessary for success in the “first war of the 21 st century.”
The authors then spent a brief paragraph explaining that a goal of this War on Terror was to
capture or kill bin Laden, but this is far from the only objective necessary in this fight. PNAC
then spent more than twice as much space explaining why a key aim of this war is to oust
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Saddam Hussein.35 In a news conference held by Secretary of State Colin Powell on 13
September 2001, which PNAC references, Powell condemned President Hussein’s silence on the
attacks of 9/11 and declared that President Hussein “is one of the leading terrorists on the face of
the Earth,” devoid of “human kindness.” Secretary of State Powell’s response isolated President
Hussein as the only member of the seven countries on the State Department’s state sponsors of
terrorism, who did not speak against the attacks, which was enough to label him as one of the
world leaders of terror in his opinion. 36 Just as PNAC presented their writings as a solution to a
post-Cold War environment, the same treatise was given as the answer to a post-9/11 world and
global terrorism.
Interestingly, the authors wrote that although President Hussein may not have been linked
to the 9/11 attacks, Hussein must be eradicated. They write that any failure to take such measures
in removing Hussein would constitute a surrender in the War on Terror. The PNAC letter
concluded the section on Iraq by stating that U.S. military forces must commit to removing all
Iraqi opposition to achieve these aims.37 Interestingly, this letter is no longer accessible through
the PNAC website but can only be found using a search tied to the WayBack Machine Internet
Archive. As influential as this letter may have been for the Bush administration, it seems that it
would be important for researchers on this subject to utilize. The deletion of this letter from the
PNAC website is curious as the organization had long-standing ties to the Bush administration.

William Kristol, et al., “Letter to President George W. Bush,” Letter to President George W.
Bush (Project for the New American Century, September 20, 2001),
https://web.archive.org/web/20131018052135/http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.ht
m.
36 “Text: U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell,” The Washington Post (WP Company), accessed
March 30, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/transcripts/powelltext_091301.html.
37 Kristol, et al., “Letter to President George W. Bush.”
35

22

People have also questioned the degree to which PNAC influenced the foreign policy decisions
of President George W. Bush.
Some scholars go so far as to say that the neoconservatives “hijacked” the administration
of President George W. Bush, and their saber-rattling ways were appealing to the mainstream
media. These same scholars believe that the neoconservatives served as a visible rejection of the
traditional U.S. conservativism. Political scientist Inderjeet Parmar believed that the foreseeable
future of U.S. foreign policy was already set in place by the end of the Presidency of George W.
Bush in 2008. Analysts later discovered that five conservative organizations that had members
who later served in the George W. Bush administration were major proponents of war with Iraq.
Of those five organizations, PNAC developed strategic planning roles for an invasion of Iraq. 38
PNAC’s connections to the U.S. government was not limited to within the George W. Bush
administration but also had twenty-seven connections to the Department of Defense, thirteen
with the State Department, twelve within the White House, ten with the National Security
Council, and a final twenty-three connections with the U.S. Congress, making it the most
interconnected agency between a think tank and the United States system of government. 39
Some of the Bush administration members that had connections to conservative think
tanks, including PNAC, were Elliot Abrams, Richard Cheney, Zalmay Khalilzad, Donald
Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Condoleezza Rice. Despite all of these connections to the Bush
administration, declaring that the PNAC or other neoconservative think tanks were controlling
government is an argument that is difficult to prove. Instead, Parmar believes that PNAC was a
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tool of the Bush administration and not the other way around.40 Although there were many
neoconservatives in the administration of President George W. Bush, many in the upper echelon
of the administration, including the president himself, were not neoconservatives but “traditional
national-interest conservatives.”41 The definition of neoconservatism evolved from its origins in
the 1930s and by the 1990s represented an intermeshed, global economy, a policy of easy
immigration, and the exportation of capitalism, by force if necessary, to areas including the
Middle East. The neoconservatives viewed President Clinton’s foreign policy of what they
considered excessive humanitarianism. 42 This is opposed to traditional conservatism that
promotes existing social structures, lower taxation rates, personal financial responsibility, and a
strong national defense, while allowing for gradual change.43
In the time between PNAC’s writings urging for the removal of President Hussein and
President George W. Bush taking the oath of office, presidential candidate George W. Bush was
the keynote speaker at the Citadel military academy in the fall of 1999. In hindsight, this speech
revealed a great deal of how Bush would re-shape U.S. foreign policy after he was elected.
Candidate Bush spoke about the importance of counter-terrorism, the defense of the nation, and
the need to keep terrorists from acquiring WMDs. In addition, candidate Bush even spoke of the
punishment that would be brought upon nations that tolerated or harbored terrorists operating
within their boundaries. However, once Bush was elected, domestic policy took the driver's seat
until the events of 11 September 2001 re-prioritized foreign policy as the preeminent issue for
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the presidency.44 It is interesting how many of the PNAC’s suggestions were carried forward to
the Bush administration of 2001.

9/11/2001, Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, and The Global War on Terror
The beginnings of the plans to invade Iraq are rooted in the first Gulf War of the early
1990s but the retaliatory strikes following 9/11 were not against Iraq. The immediate result of the
attacks on 11 September 2001 against the United States was the initiation of a Global War on
Terror, which was first referred to as a war on terror that targeted every terror group within
global reach by President George W. Bush on 20 September 2001 at a Joint Session of the 107 th
Congress.45 This Global War on Terror initiated Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The first
target of the Global War on Terror was the nation of Afghanistan, which harbored the terrorist
group al Qaeda, for launching the attacks of 9/11. As delivered at a briefing by Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Meyers,
the objectives of OEF were six-fold. First, the U.S. wanted to illustrate that the Taliban
government of Afghanistan, which supported al Qaeda, would pay a price for harboring the
terror network. Second, the U.S. hoped to acquire intelligence to target al Qaeda and the Taliban
regime further. Third, to foster relationships with oppositional forces within Afghanistan that
may ally with the U.S. to target the Taliban and other foreign terrorists connected with the
regime. Fourth, to make Afghanistan a place that terrorists would have difficulty utilizing as a
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base to launch further attacks. Fifth, to adjust the military balance in the nation of Afghanistan to
deny the Taliban offensive means that may slow down oppositional forces. Sixth, and finally, to
provide humanitarian relief to civilian populations in the nation that lived under a repressive
regime.46
General Tommy R. Franks crafted the planning and execution of OEF while working
with competing ideas of how the plan should be executed by the various branches of the U.S.
military and why certain branches would be best equipped to handle the attacks. These
competing views became challenging for Franks to establish a unified force for the joint
operation. Franks expressed his frustrations to Secretary Rumsfeld and reminded him that he
worked for the president and Secretary Rumsfeld alone. Franks stressed that this disunity would
make an effective strike difficult. Secretary Rumsfeld assured Franks that Franks was in charge
of the mission as Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).47 Ultimately, General
Franks unveiled an operation to his superiors of how best to handle the situation in Afghanistan.
Franks developed a four-phase operation for OEF. Phase I involved building forces to
provide a credible and robust command authority for military operations. The U.S. coordinated
basing and staging for forces with the countries that shared a border with Afghanistan and
utilized the CIA and special operations forces (SOF) that had infiltrated Afghanistan. Phase II
involved the initial combat operations in the nation and secured follow-up operations.
CENTCOM launched missile and air attacks against al Qaeda targets, radar systems in the
country, and defense systems. SOF, along with CIA agents, coordinated with Northern Alliance
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resistance fighters to continue the ground strikes against critical operation points. Phase III
involved continued combat operations while also continuing to build the coalition of forces
against the Taliban and al Qaeda, specifically targeting pockets of resistance. Phase IV would
establish coalition partners to stymie a resurgence of terrorist activity and begin humanitarian
assistance. This final phase was estimated to occur over a period of three to five years for
rebuilding the nation.48
Arguably, the first three phases of OEF went according to plan. 49 After that, however, the
rebuilding of Afghanistan was more difficult. The pockets of resistance that U.S. and coalition
forces faced cost 7,057 U.S. service members, 1,145 allied service members, and 3,904 U.S.
contractors' lives.50 Although the Taliban was quickly removed and al Qaeda and other resistance
forces were scattered, to call the mission in Afghanistan successful as a whole is more
complicated. Despite all of this, President George W. Bush benefited from al Qaeda’s routing in
Afghanistan and would later target terrorism worldwide. The Bush administration’s foreign
policy development as OEF was underway and facilitated the Global War on Terror (GWOT)
that would later target Iraq.
It is worth noting that there is an additional piece of the Bush administration’s thoughts
on foreign policy before President George W. Bush took office. In a 2000 article from the journal
Foreign Affairs, Condoleezza Rice wrote how future U.S. foreign policy must be crafted. Rice
asserted that U.S. interests abroad could be bolstered through strong alliances with other nations,
supported by the U.N. and other organizations, in addition to international agreements.
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Interestingly, though Rice found value in utilizing the military in a limited scope to remove
President Hussein from Kuwait as part of Operation Desert Storm, Rice warned that a president
must evaluate whether decisive military force is likely to be effective. The government must also
have a clear exit strategy from an engagement. Rice also argued that U.S. intervention in the case
of humanitarian crises should be “exceedingly rare.” 51
In the same Foreign Affairs article, Rice argued that the role of a Republican
administration in crafting U.S. foreign policy revolves around specific key priorities. A priority
for Rice was that the U.S. has the power to deter war, present a show of force, and defend U.S.
interests if deterrence fails. The second relevant priority Rice argued is that the U.S. addresses
the threat of rogue nations, a term that came about in foreign policy circles after the Cold War,
and powers hostile to U.S. interests. 52 These rogue nations, Rice asserted, are increasingly
seeking to use terrorism and develop WMDs. This linkage between terrorism, WMDs, and rogue
nations is strikingly similar to what the Bush administration would later argue as some of the
reasons that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein needed to be ousted from power. However, there is
an interesting contradiction on the acceptable use of military force by Rice. Rice noted that the
U.S. military should not be used as the world’s police force, as it will degrade capabilities and
cast the United States as a nation that grants narrow notions of sovereignty when humanitarian
issues are raised. I argue that Rice’s example of humanitarian issues that demand military force
is akin to Hussein’s history of atrocities, such as when he gassed his people. This gassing of the
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Kurds is an example of an humanitarian issue raised by the Bush administration in its case for
war against Iraq. Rice warned that this could lead to a precedent of acceptable military force that
the enemies of the U.S. may use to their ends. Perhaps the most shocking foreshadowing of U.S.
foreign policy is when Rice stated, plainly, that Iraq was living on borrowed time and the threat
of WMDs and chemical or biological weapons could appear in the hands of terrorists in the near
future. Although the scope of Rice’s article addresses more than the threat that terrorism presents
to the U.S., the regular summoning of the threat that President Hussein represented should not be
overlooked.53 Given Condoleezza Rice's role in the Bush administration and the explicit foreign
policy changes provoked by the 9/11 attacks, it is evident that several people had plans for Iraq
waiting in the wings. The crafting of the Bush doctrine and U.S. foreign policies had much of the
groundwork already developed by key members of the Bush team.
By using the retaliatory attacks against Afghanistan as a blueprint in its War on Terror,
the Bush administration began its public talking points on the need to eliminate President
Saddam Hussein in Iraq. By implying links between Hussein and al Qaeda, recalling Hussein’s
human rights abuses, and announcing intelligence that Hussein was actively pursuing WMDs,
President George W. Bush crafted rhetoric and doctrine against the rogue nation of Iraq.
However, talk of deposing President Hussein was not novel at that time and had roots going back
a number of years. I argue that the Bush administration was looking for ways to oust Hussein
rather than diplomatic measures to continue the policy of containment with the goal of complete
disarmament of the Iraqi nation.

A Sharp Break in U.S. Foreign Policy
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A key element examined throughout this thesis is a government publication issued by the
Executive Office of The White House, ordered annually by the U.S. Congress, titled the National
Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS was instituted in 1987, during the presidency of Ronald
Reagan, and aimed to declare the priorities of the presidential administration. These priorities of
the administration include economic interests, humanitarian goals, and military defense goals. In
President Reagan’s first NSS, the manner in which the United States would respond to terrorist
threats was a key article of concern. The manner in which the priorities of the NSS documents
changed under each administration shows the great contrast from President Reagan to President
George W. Bush in 2002. One of the critical arguments of this thesis is that U.S. foreign policy
under President George W. Bush underwent a significant change compared to Clinton and
Reagan, the previous two presidential administrations.
Political scientist, global affairs specialist, and former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Ivo
Daalder and political scientist, economist, and chair on the Council of Foreign Relations, James
M. Lindsay wrote on the interpretation of how the attacks of 9/11 shaped President George W.
Bush’s foreign policy in a new manner. Daalder and Lindsay argued that 9/11 prompted the Bush
administration to focus on foreign policy and the War on Terror as the mission of the Bush
presidency. President George W. Bush and his team spent roughly two years after the 9/11
attacks developing and revising the scope and targets going forward.54 The critical point that the
Bush administration’s foreign policy agenda became known for was their interpretation of what a
pre-emptive attack would look like in practice. This manner in which how the U.S. would deal
with terrorist organizations came directly from President George W. Bush’s “The National
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Security Strategy of the United States of America” from September 2002. This document
elucidates the opening for an invasion of Iraq:
While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the
international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to
exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists,
to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country 55
This excerpt from the 2002 NSS plainly stated that the Bush administration was more than
willing to act pre-emptively to neutralize a perceived threat to the United States. The term preemption became the crux of the issue concerning the invasion of Iraq. However, not all scholars
are in agreement on the importance of the text of President George W. Bush’s 2002 NSS. An
example of this position is historian Melvyn P. Leffler.
Historian Melvyn P. Leffler authored a journal article in 2005 that promoted the position
that there was “more continuity than change” in the foreign policy of President George W. Bush.
However, Leffler also stated that even if there was a change in the administration’s policies, it
was not a revolutionary change. 56 Leffler referred to the change in policy as a recalibration due
to the changing nature of the oppositional forces against the U.S. Leffler recognized that many
political scientists and historians cite President George W. Bush’s 2002 National Security
Strategy as revolutionary because of the language of pre-emption. However, Leffler argued that
the same document continues the foreign policy position of previous presidents, such as stressing
economic freedom, human rights, and a value of democracy while adapting to twenty-firstcentury problems like global terror. In Leffler’s mind, these continuities are evidence that there
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was nothing revolutionary about President George W. Bush’s foreign policy agenda as laid out in
the 2002 NSS.57 However, the aspect of a war on terrorism on a global scale was a step outside
of the wars that were limited in scope and were cautious in the deployment of military forces.
The attacks of 9/11 opened the door for a broad authorization of military force by the United
States Congress against al Qaeda but notably did not authorize a broad war on terror. 58 President
George W. Bush’s expanded War on Terror into Iraq was enabled after Afghanistan, in large part
by the 2002 NSS. Despite Leffler’s position that the Bush administration’s policies were a
continuation of previous administrations’ policies, most published work does not stand behind
this perspective.
Pentagon official Douglas Feith declared that it was critical to find ties between terrorist
networks and their state sponsors as the principal objective in the War on Terror. 59 I assert that
President George W. Bush’s 2002 NSS made it clear that the United States will act unilaterally,
in a military sense, to act pre-emptively in self-defense to prevent harm to the U.S.60 This
paragraph of the 2002 NSS made it clear that the Bush administration would act unilaterally and
keep other nation’s leaders out of the decision-making process if it so desired. With the events of
9/11, foreign policy took priority for the Bush administration. The attacks reminded U.S. citizens
and their leadership that the nations that flanked them could no longer provide protection from
their enemies. The ignoble terrorists represented was a talking point of President George W.
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Bush during his national address and would morph into the “Axis of Evil.” Former U.S.
Permanent Representative to NATO Ivo H. Daalder and Senior Vice President, Director of
Studies, and Chair of the Council of Foreign Relations James M. Lindsay argue that President
George W. Bush’s codified doctrine of pre-emption was novel because it gave the United States
the ability to utilize military force against potential threats that may harm the U.S. 61
Concurring with Daalder and Lindsay’s position on President George W. Bush’s foreign
policy, political scientist Alexander Moens argued that the threat of the use of WMDs by
terrorists that the president regularly spoke of reinforced the need for pre-emptive military
action. President George W. Bush positioned the U.S. to no longer wait for a threat to materialize
in the shape of a mushroom cloud on the horizon but take an offensive posture through a preemptive war with the hopes of preventing this from happening. Moens declared the position of
pre-emptive military action as a revolutionary turn in U.S. foreign policy. Despite the departure
of the previous presidential NSS documents that described pre-emptive action as something used
in a retaliatory manner President George W. Bush’s pre-emptive action was more preventative.
However, U.S. citizens supported the president, giving him a ninety-two per cent approval rating
in October 2001. President George W. Bush shaped the image of the enemy in historical terms
by declaring Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the nations composing the “Axis of Evil.” Without
stating it, I believe that the Bush administration was alluding to the Axis powers of World War II
that included Japan, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy, instead of tying the conflict of Iraq to the
more recent Vietnam War that haunted the U.S. memory. Although President George W. Bush
did not use the phrase regularly after the 2002 State of the Union address, it represented the
administration’s new foreign policy agenda in the post-9/11 world that saw all nations against the
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U.S. as enemies of the state. 62 This black-and-white thinking placed the nations of the world as
either with the United States or against the United States. This period also marked a change in
U.S. foreign policy where terrorists were brought to trial for their crimes and instead were treated
as enemy combatants because they were not part of a uniformed military but individual actors
performing terrorist attacks. While defining the enemies of the U.S., it would be important for
the Bush administration to create a partnership of allied countries willing to support the invasion
out of fear that terrorism may strike their citizens. The Coalition of the Willing is discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
The definition of pre-emption is also at issue in this thesis. I repeatedly argue that the
meaning of the term pre-emption changed in the period from President Reagan through President
George W. Bush. However, as Flynn described the story of the 2003 invasion, the war was not
pre-emptive but preventative. Flynn’s stance, which I agree with, is that the war was preventative
as Iraq did not pose an imminent threat. However, to keep the terminology consistent with each
of these presidents' official written foreign policy, I will continue to use the labeling of Iraq as a
pre-emptive war. Flynn also argued that the labeling of Iraq as a pre-emptive war suggests that
military action by the United States would eliminate the threat Iraq posed to the nation. Instead,
it made things worse by destabilizing the region further. Flynn also noted, as have other scholars,
that the failure to find WMDs in Iraq post-invasion forced President George W. Bush to alter the
stated goal of the invasion after the fact. President George W. Bush later argued that Iraq’s desire
and intent to pursue WMDs gave the U.S. just cause to pre-emptively strike Iraq. Flynn declared
that when Condoleezza Rice spoke in April 2007 and stated that an imminent threat is posed if
you are in a better position to strike today and address a threat than to wait until tomorrow, it
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revealed preventive logic and not a pre-emptive position. By doing this, Flynn argued that the
Bush administration lost the “moral high ground.”63 Before diving deeper into the issue of the
history of the Iraq invasion in 2003, it is necessary to review the history of the National Security
Strategy and its role in declaring the domestic and foreign policy priorities of the United States.
To understand how significant of a break is at issue with the 2002 NSS requires
awareness of how the Bush administration’s stance against terrorism was significantly broad. In
the post-9/11 era, nations were responsible for terrorist planning or any relevant activities that
occurred within their borders. There was no difference between state sponsors of terror and
groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan that did not approve of the presence of al Qaeda but
tolerated their presence and actions. By expanding military action as a response to activity, the
2002 NSS permitted preventative action, labeled as pre-emption, which would arguably
neutralize potential threats before they materialized. The NSS codified what the policy of the
wartime presidency of George W. Bush would be after 9/11.
I have made a deliberate effort to show the change in U.S. foreign policy as it relates to
terrorism in general, the U.S. policy regarding Iraq, and the threat posed by the al Qaeda network
as it became a more significant part of the story for the nation. President George W. Bush did not
lay out his policy regarding terrorism until after the attacks of 11 September 2001. In the wake of
those attacks, it is not surprising that the issue of terrorism, which became more significant
during each presidency, became the primary issue for the president. President George W. Bush
had already retaliated against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan for their roles in carrying
out and tolerating terrorism when the 2002 “The National Security Strategy of the United States
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of America” was released to the public. As I noted earlier, this 2002 NSS departed from the
previous presidents’ policies regarding terrorism and Iraq when it declared that the president will
act pre-emptively against terrorists. Although President Clinton, for instance, reported the
targeted strikes against the al Qaeda training camp as pre-emptive action, it was still limited in
scope. Instead, in the 2002 NSS, pre-emptive action could include the removal of the leader of a
sovereign state before a terrorist act could occur. President George W. Bush stressed the threat of
a rogue nation acquiring WMDs that could target the U.S. or its interests abroad. 64 This
significant change in U.S. foreign policy opened the door to invade Iraq in 2003 as part of the
United States’ War on Terror.

What Happened After the Invasion of Iraq
When the United States invaded Iraq on 19 March 2003 it immediately tasked certain
military units to work with weapons inspectors in the hunt for WMDs. It has been nearly twenty
years since that event and to this day no WMDs have been found in Iraq. In the months
following the invasion, President George W. Bush was forced to acknowledge that the smoking
gun of WMDs had not yet been found in Iraq. In a New York Times article from 4 October 2003,
Bush stated that a report from his chief weapons inspector that preliminary findings indicated
that Iraq was attempting to obtain missiles proved that “Saddam Hussein was a danger to the

George W. Bush, “Historical Office - The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America,” (2002), pp. 1-35.
64

36

world.”65 In the same article from the Times President Bush shifted the need for the ousting of
President Hussein to one of a humanitarian nature to relieve the suffering endured by Iraqi
citizens in extreme interrogations and torture at the hands of the Hussein regime. The shift of the
reason for the war in Iraq was not lost on Congressional Democrats who questioned the Bush
administration’s reasoning and questioned the truthfulness of Bush and his team. 66
Even by 26 January 2004, when WMDs had not been found, British Foreign Secretary
Jack Straw explained that although the failure to find WMDs was “disappointing” President
Hussein had these weapons and the ousting of the regime was justified. 67 Months later, on 7
October 2004, President George W. Bush and Vice President Cheney admitted, in the most
straightforward terms up to that point, that President Hussein did not have WMDs. However,
they insisted that the war was still justified because Hussein had abused the U.N.’s Oil-for-Food
Program. Senator John Kerry, who was a presidential candidate at the time, insisted that it was
irrational to come up with reasons for going to war after the invasion had already occurred.
President George W. Bush blamed the flaw on his intelligence agencies. 68 This pivot was drastic
as WMDs represented, as the Bush administration had insisted, an imminent threat to the United
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States and it seems hard to believe that the aforementioned U.N. program represented a similar
threat.
When President George W. Bush spoke aboard the aircraft carrier the USS Abraham
Lincoln and declared that major combat operations had ended on 1 May 2003, he stated that as a
result of the Iraqi invasion no other nations could receive WMDs from Iraq. But as journalist
Susan Campbell questioned, what did it mean if Iraq didn’t have weapons to pass along to begin
with? President George W. Bush countered that sort of logic in a speech in Lima, Ohio on 24
April 2003 that the war was just because Saddam Hussein was a despot and that the Iraqi citizens
have a better life in his absence, forced as it was.69

Why Did the Bush Administration Target Iraq Instead of Another
Member of the Axis of Evil?
The development of the Bush doctrine, as codified by The National Security Strategy of
the United States, released in 2002, was created with the invasion of Iraq in mind. Setting the
legality of such actions aside until the end of this chapter, I focus on how the war on terror in
Afghanistan soon became a War on Terror in a broader sense and included Iraq due to a
perceived threat. The Bush Doctrine changed how the U.S. would target terrorist organizations
and their providers of safe haven. President George W. Bush used the fear of nuclear weapons
targeting the U.S. to build support for an invasion of Iraq that he claimed possessed said
weapons. The threat of nuclear arms resurrects the memory of the Cold War and the fear that
many U.S. citizens did not have to go too far back to recall. President George W. Bush
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repeatedly declared that Iraq either already had WMDs or was actively pursuing them and
closing in on achieving those aims.
If the Bush administration knew that the intelligence of WMDs and Iraq was false, that
begs the question of what their motivation was. Although President Hussein’s regime had been
brutal and repressive towards its people in the past, a CIA report indicated that it actively
avoided antagonizing the U.S. or its interests abroad.70 However, the Bush administration
continued in its attempts to tie Iraq to terrorism, including the anthrax scare in the U.S. following
the attacks of 9/11. The anthrax attacks scared the nation after a second report to the FBI
indicated that an incident affected an aide to NBC News Correspondent Tom Brokaw tested
positive two weeks after handling threatening letters to Mr. Brokaw which contained a white
powder and a sandy substance. 71 Security expert Paul Rogers believed that one potential motive
for a U.S. invasion of Iraq were the significant oil reserves in the Persian Gulf that were
important to the United States. 72 Rogers reinforced this position by arguing that oil would be a
factor due to the threat of the rogue regime of Iraq, whose sphere of influence affected U.S.
allies, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Rogers concedes that the concept of Iraq
holding WMDs would be something that the Bush administration would not accept. However,
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Rogers believes that toppling the Hussein administration, if it did have WMDs, would be
required by any administration in the post-9/11 environment.73
Georgetown University Research Associate Dionysis Markakis is aligned with Rogers in
his belief that the region's oil reserves, and the security of Israel were the primary reasons for
attempting to stabilize Iraq by removing Hussein. However, Markakis believed the concept of
containing Iraq was no longer acceptable after the attacks of 9/11. Markakis believed that
instituting a regime favorable to the U.S. in Iraq would pressure Iran and North Korea, the
members of the “Axis of Evil,” as well as Syria. 74 In addition, the prospect of establishing a
permanent U.S. base in Iraq would remove the reliance on Saudi Arabia of providing a place to
station U.S. troops, as had been done since 1991. This collection of benefits that the U.S. would
reap by ousting Hussein reinforced the goals of the neoconservative wing of politics tied to
President George W. Bush. Furthermore, the Bush administration touted the benefits of
democratizing the nation of Iraq and the introduction of liberal democratic values and freemarket capitalism in the hopes that it would spread through the Middle East and further reinforce
U.S. hegemony.75
However, the Bush administration had considered taking action against Iraq the minute
President George W. Bush took office. As much as the administration desired to take action
against Iraq, they continued to hesitate in the pre-9/11 environment to strike the regime, which
they analogized as a “grumbling appendix” that warranted attention but would be delayed for the
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time being.76 Nevertheless, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld expressed his frustrations that
the president was not yet willing to act against Iraq at the end of July 2001. Rumsfeld believed
that inaction against Iraq would merely prolong the inevitable and allow Hussein to accumulate a
more extensive nuclear arsenal. In the winter following 9/11, Bush requested an updated strategy
review of Iraq. President George W. Bush and his administration moved closer to war with Iraq
as time rolled on.77 CIA Director George Tenet acknowledged in his book that “had 9/11 not
happened, the argument to go to war in Iraq undoubtedly would have been much harder to make”
and “whether the case could have been made at all is uncertain.” 78
Tenet argued that Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz believed in a connection between
Iraq and the attacks of September 11. Tenet recalled that Wolfowitz believed the ousting of
Hussein would invoke a significant change in the peace in the Middle East, but Tenet disagreed
on the likelihood of that occurring. Tenet also recalled that immediately following 9/11, a
National Security Council official met with the White House. The White House team expressed
their desire to oust Saddam, at which time the NSC official stated, “If you want to go after that
son of a bitch to settle old scores, be my guest. But don’t tell us he is connected to 9/11 or to
terrorism because there is no evidence to support that. You will have to have a better reason.” 79
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In regard to democratizing the Middle East, Tenet recalled that many policymakers believed the
U.S. would be viewed as liberators of the Iraqi people. However, intelligence experts thought
that if U.S. forces did receive such a response, it would be fleeting unless the troops could secure
the area of operations and then said support would likely deteriorate. Although an initial reaction
of the Iraqi citizenry may be positive, the area would be in chaos from the military action and if a
swift institution of order could not be developed, rioting and unrest would occur. At this point,
the citizens would look at the occupying military force as hostile to the peace of their nation and
the initial support the people had for the U.S. military would turn into resentment. Shortly after
that, the topic at Executive Steering Groups at the White House switched from whether or not to
invade Iraq into what needed to occur when the U.S. went to war. Tenet also noted that U.S.
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice told American diplomat Richard Haas that the
decision to invade Iraq had already been made, although it does not state by whom, by July 2002.
Those plans would not change, barring Iraq meeting all the demands of the U.S. The Bush
administration was about to expand its war on terrorism to a new front in Iraq. 80
Supporting Tenet’s claims that the U.S. had already decided on an invasion in Iraq as far
back as mid-2002, the classified U.K. “Downing Street Memo,” dated 23 July 2002 revealed that
a British agent noted that military action against Iraq was “now seen as inevitable.” The
document also revealed that “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified
by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD” and that “intelligence and facts were being fixed
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around the policy.”81 Unsurprisingly, President George W. Bush’s autobiography failed to
mention the decision to attack Iraq in 2002 or the Downing Street Memo. However, the same
autobiography recalled the initial debate of whether or not to attack Iraq after the 9/11 attacks,
with the cooler heads of Colin Powell and George Tenet swaying the administration from
lumping Iraq together with al Qaeda.82 Additional evidence supporting the earlier assertion that
the Bush administration had essentially decided upon an invasion of Iraq by 2002 comes from
the second autobiography of Secretary of State Colin Powell. In Powell’s autobiography, It
Worked for Me: In Life and Leadership, Powell recalled meeting with President George W. Bush
on 5 August 2002 to discuss the “pros and cons of the Iraq crisis.” Powell also stated that
momentum was building, and a march toward an invasion of Iraq seemed very likely.83 Powell
also reminded the President that if the U.S. takes a government by force, "you break it, you own
it.”84 Despite the questionable decision to invade Iraq and the U.S.’s responsibilities should such
action be taken, the president still appeared as a strong leader in the eyes of the U.S. populace.
President George W. Bush benefited from being regarded as a wartime president in the
wake of 9/11. By October 2001, President George W. Bush established a ninety-two per cent
approval rating and was highly regarded by the U.S. citizenry. However, despite the general
public’s view of Bush as a strong leader, it is worth mentioning that the attacks of 9/11 were not
a complete surprise to the intelligence community. The classified President’s Daily Briefing
dated 6 August 2001 was conspicuously titled “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in U.S.” The
briefing paper, declassified on 10 April 2004, briefly reminded the president of the history of
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terrorist attacks launched by al Qaeda against the United States and ended with a warning that
some intelligence indicated that bin Laden was suspected of planning the hijacking of U.S.
aircraft to negotiate the release of the “Blind Shaykh” Omar Abdel-Rahman. The document also
warned that further intelligence supports a potential hijacking and surveillance of federal
buildings in New York.85 This grave intelligence failure was the responsibility of many actors,
but the president bears a great deal of responsibility. The response to this intelligence failure may
have prompted President George W. Bush to deliver a comprehensive response to terrorism with
his new War on Terror.
To support the assertion that Iraq had possession of WMDs and posed an imminent threat
to the United States, President George W. Bush requested that the Director of Central
Intelligence compile an updated National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq. The document,
titled “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” addressed various pieces
of intelligence on the state. Early in the NIE, the document declared that, although Iraqi
inspections ended in 1998, the state continued its chemical weapons program, strengthened its
missile program, developed biological weapons; and in the view of most intelligence agencies,
President Hussein attempted to revive its nuclear weapons program. The NIE does stop short of
declaring that President Hussein currently had a nuclear weapons program or even the material to
develop said weapons. However, the NIE depicted Saddam Hussein as focused on acquiring
WMDs.86
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Regarding the timeline for Iraq to create a nuclear weapon, the NIE estimated that, in an
improbable scenario, the state may be able to develop enough fissile material to create a nuclear
weapon between 2005 and 2007 if it can acquire the necessary materials and the state had the
scientific knowledge to build uranium enrichment facilities. The document also stated that,
hypothetically, President Hussein may turn over chemical and biological weapons to an
organization like al Qaeda that was already engaged in a jihad against the United States.
On its face, this document seemed to reinforce everything that President George W. Bush
claimed regarding Iraq and its ties to terrorism. However, scattered throughout the document are
sections titled “State/INR Alternative View of Iraq’s Nuclear Program.” The first of these callout boxes stated that The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR)
believed that although Saddam desired nuclear weapons and may have a limited effort to acquire
these weapons capabilities, the State/INR declared that the evidence does not give a compelling
case that Iraq was in the middle of “an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear
weapons.”87
The NIE explicitly stated that it had low confidence of when President Hussein would use
WMDs, whether President Hussein would engage in covert attacks against U.S. soil, and whether
President Hussein would pass chemical or biological weapons to al Qaeda or other terrorist
networks. A significant point in the document that ties into the imminence of the threat that Iraq
posed to the United States is in an INR Alternate View of the intelligence. The INR alternate
view stated that, there was “no compelling reason to judge that Iraq has entered the timeframe of
‘at least five to seven years’ [to produce sufficient weapons grade fissile material to construct a
nuclear weapon]” and the belief that Iraq could have nuclear weapons capabilities within “three
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to five years [on a shortened timeline]” is highly unlikely.88 Also in the document is a note that
Niger had planned to send several tons of uranium to Iraq for enrichment, a crucial part of
producing nuclear weapons. However, other intelligence sources contradicted this claim. Integral
to uranium enrichment are milling facilities, but all known milling facilities were destroyed by
Desert Storm, and the construction of a new milling facility would require three to five years of
continuous work.89 It is details like I have highlighted here that the Bush administration cherrypicked to suit their needs and depict Iraq as in possession of WMDs and an imminent threat to
the security of the U.S. and democracy worldwide. However, intelligence reports before the war
did not confirm such claims and reports after the invasion proved the claims to be patently
false.90 Had the administration been honest about the findings of the NIE, the imminent threat
that President George W. Bush claimed was present in Iraq would appear highly questionable to
any investigators.
George Tenet acknowledged the NIE made clear that President Hussein did not have
WMDs and that if he had to create his own fissile material, he would have been unlikely to have
enough to create a nuclear weapon until 2007 to 2009. The NIE was filled with best guesses and
estimates where the intelligence simply did not exist once the inspections ceased after the end of
the first Gulf War.91 Daalder and Lindsay argue that President George W. Bush’s claims about
the imminent threat Iraq posed and the extent of President Hussein’s nuclear weapons
capabilities were based on intelligence that analysts did not agree upon. The claims that Hussein
had met with someone in Niger to purchase uranium were disproven months before the NIE was
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presented through the appropriate channels to the president. Furthermore, even the basis for the
Niger arrangement appeared to have been created with forged documents. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), responsible for inspecting Iraq’s weapons, agreed that much of
the NIE on Iraq was disputable. Immediately before the invasion of Iraq on 19 March 2003, the
IAEA director stated before the U.N. Security Council on 7 March 2003 that inspectors had still
come up empty on any evidence or indication that Iraq had revived its nuclear program after
Desert Storm.92
Although George Tenet downplayed the significance of the claims of a tie between Iraq
and Niger in a supposed sale of yellowcake uranium, others, such as the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, noted that the intelligence was always flawed and its use, important in
President George W. Bush’s story of Iraq in the 21st century. The Carnegie Endowment stated
that the media had found the intelligence regarding this purported transaction had roots in a
British white paper stating that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger despite a lack of a nuclear
power program that would require it. From December 2002 into January 2003, Bush
administration officials, including Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld, repeated the claim
publicly, failing to mention the British report from which it originated. The claim was central to
President George W. Bush’s assertion in the January 2002 State of the Union speech in which he
uttered his infamous sixteen words: “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” This claim became part of the
U.S. plans for an invasion of Iraq.93
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Although Iraq had purchased uranium from Niger, Portugal, and Brazil when developing
a nuclear program in the 1970s, it ceased the procurement of uranium from other nations within
ten years due to producing its own uranium. However, these 500 tons of natural uranium and
roughly two tons of lesser grade uranium were known to IAEA inspectors and were kept sealed,
by 1993, and assessed annually (after 1998) by the weapons inspectors. 94 Therefore, the IAEA
sealed uranium was essentially inaccessible by the Iraqi regime. Noting the lack of unclassified
intelligence before the 2002 NIE on Iraq, my investigation on the subject relies largely on this
same NIE for information about the claims of Niger yellowcake released to Iraq. 95 The INR
alternate views that are interspersed throughout the NIE reveal a crucial point near the end of the
document. The NIE stated, “the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR’s
assessment, highly dubious.”96 In addition, a document from the U.S. Vice President’s Office
from 9 June 2003, indicated the significant concern that the CIA had about the purported
negotiations between Iraq and Niger in the former procuring uranium from the latter. In the
memorandum to the vice president, the document stated that the Iraq-Niger story was included in
the 2002 NIE in an effort to report all possible information on the state of weapons proliferation
in Iraq at the time. The memorandum also stated that on 3 March 2003, sixteen days before the
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invasion of Iraq, the documents proving the Iraq-Niger uranium deal were proven to be forgeries
by the IAEA.97
Condoleezza Rice’s autobiography acknowledged that the intelligence on the Niger
yellowcake was false. A final interesting note on the Niger yellowcake scandal is that Donald
Rumsfeld’s autobiography makes no mention of the sixteen words or the Niger uranium
intelligence.98 Dick Cheney’s recollection of the sixteen words debacle spins the story in a way
that makes it seem that the CIA cleared the president’s speech despite George Tenet’s
reservations about the intelligence. Cheney further supported the sixteen words by stating that
The British stood by their intelligence on the matter. Cheney tried to save face while also
blaming Rice for her “major mistake” when she later publicly apologized for the inclusion of the
intelligence. Cheney also stated that Tenet was “furious” for having to apologize for the
inclusion of the Niger reference and presumed ties to Iraq.99 It seems that some members of the
Bush administration have made an effort to avoid this flawed or manipulated intelligence in
creating deceitful legacies.
Rice revealed that George Tenet had requested that the sixteen words uttered in the 2002
State of the Union address be removed from a previous presidential speech. However, Rice
stated that because the Central Intelligence Agency did not formally request the same phrase be
removed from the State of the Union address, it made it into the speech. Rice stated that even
though the sixteen words were included in the State of the Union address, the fact that the
intelligence was false was lost in the sea of information that they continued to believe was
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credible and important in making a case for invading Iraq. To give some credence to the Niger
uranium story, Rice claimed that the 2002 NIE on Iraq supported it. 100 This claim, as stated
earlier, was dismissed by the INR Alternative View within the report. The story of Niger’s
yellowcake deal is a salient example of how intelligence groups had differing opinions from the
Bush administration in what was considered credible in its case for the invasion of Iraq.

Why Didn’t Hussein Simply Allow Weapons Inspections?
The question is regularly raised of why President Hussein didn’t simply give proof to the
United States, the United Nations, and the IAEA that there was a significant difference between
his nation’s previous weapons capabilities and the baren state that things were in just before the
U.S. invasion. I support the theories of Daalder and Lindsay, addressed below, that attempt to
answer this question. I also agree with the majority opinion of legal scholars that the invasion of
Iraq was illegal based upon the claims of the threat the U.S. argued that Iraq posed. Daalder and
Lindsay’s beliefs rest upon two points. One belief is that Saddam may have dismantled or
destroyed the vast majority of his weapons with the hope that the U.N. inspectors would return to
New York City and proclaim that Iraq was meeting the international obligations, removing the
case for war. However, even if Hussein had destroyed or dismantled his weapons, it would be to
his benefit not to make such news public as Iraq’s neighboring countries may have used this
information to plan their own attack or invasion of the nation. Alternatively, Hussein may have
refused to make this information public because it could threaten his power over the citizens of
Iraq. That power would be more valuable than the United States or the United Nations threat. If
we accept that Saddam had no nuclear capabilities and the state of his chemical and biological
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stockpile was aged and questionable, the Bush administration’s justification for war rings
hollow. President George W. Bush would later claim that removing Hussein was just cause
enough for the invasion of Iraq. However, Hussein’s removal would have only made sense if the
imminent threat that President George W. Bush told the international community had existed was
actually present.101 President George W. Bush did not sell intelligence and reasoning. He sold
fear to a nation that was still traumatized by 9/11.

Was the Invasion Legal by International Law or the U.N. Perspective?
Finally, the question of the legality of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been briefly
examined with existing literature. The number of legal scholars that argue that the invasion of
Iraq was legal by international law standards is limited. Despite the limited legal writing on this
topic, the majority of legal experts that I have reviewed stated that the invasion was illegal and I
am persuaded by their arguments into agreeing with them for the reasons illustrated by each
subject expert in the majority. Writing of the perspective that the invasion was illegal are
sociologist and criminal justice scholar Ronald Kramer, criminal justice scholar Raymond
Michalowski, and criminologist and criminal justice scholar Dawn Rothe. These three legal
scholars argued four key points regarding the legality of the Iraqi invasion. Their first point was,
“The 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq by the United States and its allies was a
violation of international law. Although the three additional points are deserving of attention, the
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area that this thesis focuses on limits my attention to the first point regarding the legality in the
area of international law. 102
Kramer et al. argued that when the U.S. signed, and the U.S. Senate ratified the U.N.
Charter, it embodied international law that “codifies and supersedes all existing international law
and customs.”103 Kramer et al. presented that the U.N. Charter explicitly opposed the action of
war. The authors cited Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter that stated, “All members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or [behave] in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.”104 Although the authors discussed the resolutions legal scholar
John Yoo cited as permissive use of force against Iraq, they do not come to the same conclusions
as Yoo. Kramer et al. found that these U.N. resolutions did have a shelf life and had expired after
the years had passed. The authors recognized the failure of the Bush administration to obtain a
resolution from the U.N. Security Council to invade Iraq as indicative that the previous
resolutions were no longer applicable. The evidence that these authors used demonstrated that
the legality of the invasion of Iraq is quite questionable. 105 British Prime Minister Tony Blair
wrote in his autobiography that the failure to obtain an endorsement from the U.N. to enforce the
WMD disarmament resolutions of the Security Council was due in part to the Bush
administration’s stance on the issue of unilateralism in pre-emptive enforcement and
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neutralization of the threat in Iraq. 106 The failure of diplomacy would lead to war. Writing on the
legal side favoring President George W. Bush is legal scholar John Yoo.
Yoo’s position is one of the most persuasive arguments of the invasion's legality. Yoo
built his argument about the legality of the invasion of attack in a rather convincing manner,
likely due to his years working as an attorney for the administration of President George W.
Bush. Although the journal article did not disclose his years with the Bush administration, it is
easily found by anyone who takes the time to look up his curriculum vitae online. The timing of
the journal article, published very soon after the invasion of Iraq, raised doubts about the legality
of the invasion when a member of the administration was tasked with writing in support of the
effort.107 Yoo argued that a specific U.N. Security Council resolution, Resolution 678, authorized
member states to enforce the Iraq cease-fire and restore international peace and security. The
U.N. implemented these resolutions after the Gulf War of 1990-1991. As mentioned earlier,
other scholars dismissed Yoo’s perspective and argued that Resolution 678’s enforcement period
had expired. The fact that the U.N. Security Council could not agree on military action in Iraq
meant the resolution was not supported. Yoo stated that this opinion was not legally correct. Yoo
also cited, what he believed, were false statements or omissions by the Iraqi WMD program as
demonstrative of a breach of the nation’s obligations under Resolutions 1441, 678, and 687.
Resolution 1441 authorized a member nation to use military force to ensure Iraq’s adherence to
the U.N. Security Council Resolutions. The resolutions in question are the aforementioned 678
and 687. Resolution 678 authorized all necessary means to bring Iraq into complying with the
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U.N. Resolutions after Desert Storm. Resolution 687 referred to Iraq’s breach of its obligation to
fully destroy its WMDs and the affiliated delivery systems.108
President George W. Bush used the fear of WMDs in the hands of terrorists as a major
reason for a pre-emptive invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, the notion of pre-emption related to
the invasion of a sovereign nation seemed anathema to world leaders, as well as the U.N. by and
large. Addressing the most critical issue was the matter of the pre-emptive invasion of Iraq. Yoo
argued that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter reinforced the right for a member state to act in selfdefense. However, even Yoo acknowledged that Article 51’s self-defense clause was limited to
an armed attack. Despite this concession of a differing point of view, Yoo stated that he did not
believe that the persons who created the U.N. Charter would intend for Article 51 to be so
limited in scope.
U.N. Secretary General during the George W. Bush administration, Kofi Annan,
discussed the topic of the legality of the invasion of Iraq in his autobiography. Annan stated that
when he gave an interview to the BBC on 15 September 2004, he believed that there should have
been a second U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing military action before it took place.
But even then, it would have been up to the Security Council to decide what the next step in
appropriate action should have been. Ultimately, Annan stated in the interview that the invasion
of Iraq in 2003 was illegal and against the U.N. Charter. Although Annan had implied this
position before, this was the first time that he expressed such a definitive stance on the matter. 109
Although Annan expressed this position, the fact that it came over a year after the initial invasion

Yoo, “International Law and the War in Iraq,” pp. 567-571.
Kofi Atta Annan and Nader Mousavizadeh, Interventions a Life in War and Peace (New
York, NY: Penguin Books, 2013), p. 316.
108
109

54

led many in the international community to see the U.N. as lacking credibility and relevance
when a member state could target Iraq unilaterally in its War on Terror. 110
The Dean of the Swinburne University Law School and Professor of Law, Mirko Bagaric
and lawyer James McConvill, wrote on the legality of the invasion of Iraq and what it means
now. Bagaric and McConvill agree that the United States’ military action, that included bombing
the nation of Iraq to the point of neutralization while killing a considerable number of civilians
and bringing the infrastructure to a state of ruin, was illegal. However, the U.S. faced no
repercussions, let alone sanctions by the U.N. As Iraq did not execute an armed attack against the
U.S. the basis of the United States justification for war was entirely absent. Bagaric and
McConvill also found fault in using U.N. Resolution 687 (identified as the cease-fire resolution
following the Gulf War of 1990-91) as allowing for a member state to enforce the resolution.
Even the argument that the U.S. invasion would stop a pre-eminent attack, Bagaric and
McConvill note that the U.N. Charter never gave a legal right for a state to use military force in
the eyes of a perceived threat. However, they concede that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
recognized the right of self-defense. But the U.N. Charter’s Article 2(4) must be considered that
states that members must restrain from the use of force. Despite this, it is difficult to agree that
the U.S. faced an imminent threat that would justify pre-emptive military force against Iraq. 111
The United States’ main argument for an invasion of Iraq was the reasoning that Hussein
possessed WMDs. However, as Bagaric and McConvill asserted, there was no conclusive
evidence of that belief even in the days before war. When that argument began to come apart, the
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U.S. stated that Hussein sought to acquire WMDs. There is a significant difference between
possessing WMDs and hoping to acquire them. Even after more than 550 inspections of Iraqi
sites believed by some in the intelligence communities as being associated with these WMDs,
U.N. weapons inspectors found neither weapons stockpiles nor the necessary capacity to produce
such weapons following the invasion. Bagaric and McConvill note that even Iraq’s neighbors
dismissed the assertion that Iraq had WMDs. Because of the overwhelming lack of evidence, this
shows that the U.S.’s main argument for invading the sovereign nation did not satisfy the burden
of proof required for the United States to act in self-defense.112
Writing within months of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and therefore not able to utilize
later declassified intelligence and the results of U.N. weapons inspections, law professor Ronli
Sifris wrote a detailed analysis on the legality of the unilateral military action. Sifris wrote on
whether the war was justified using just what was in the public realm of knowledge in 2003.
Sifris reiterated the intelligence by the Iraqi defector known as “Curveball” who was distrusted
by most of the world’s intelligence communities. Sifris also stated that Iraq had ties to terrorism,
which while true in the respect of Hussein funding attacks on Israelis, is not true regarding ties to
al Qaeda. Despite both of these significant flaws, Sifris still asserted, like other legal scholars,
that the U.S. argument for the invasion of Iraq as self-defense was flawed because of the lack of
an imminent threat. Interestingly, when discussing self-defense, Sifris noted that when the
United States launched air strikes against Libya for its terrorist strikes against U.S. military
members, the U.N. General Assembly condemned the strikes, even though they were launched to
pre-empt further attacks. Despite this fact, Sifris argued that anticipatory self-defense was lawful.
Sifris argued, like members of the Bush administration, that a state cannot wait for an attack to
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occur to strike back. However, in this legal review, Sifris ultimately conceded that the invasion
of Iraq was not lawful as the U.S. did not exhaust all diplomatic measures to combat the
perceived threat. Sifris concluded this document with a note that the invasion was not legal
because it was not authorized by any U.N. Security Council resolution. 113
Although I am not a lawyer or expert on international law, I found the arguments both for
and against the invasion to be rather straightforward based upon my understanding of the U.N.
Security Council resolutions as they pertain to Iraq. All legal scholars aside from Yoo agreed that
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was illegal and most refer to the same analysis of the U.N. Charter
and the resolutions dating from the Gulf War of 1990-91 through the disarmament of resolution
1441. I found the majority opinion to be the most persuasive, especially when you consider that
Yoo was a member of the Bush administration during the period implicated. Therefore, his
neutrality on the issue is called into question. What is perhaps most interesting is whether a
nation may use the precedence of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 as justification to accomplish
their own aims and disregarding the U.N. in keeping the peace among member nations.
Furthermore, because the U.N. did not sanction the U.S. for its unilateral attack against a
sovereign state, it must be asked what the role of the United Nations is in the current day. These
are questions that deserve further attention from future scholars. The final piece of this chapter
examines the role of the United States as hegemon and what impact the War on Terror had on the
U.S.
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The Burden of the Hegemon
The desire to assemble a clear picture of how the United States invaded Iraq after 11
September 2001 is relevant as a recent example of how the office holder of the U.S. presidency
has the power to shape U.S. foreign policy and lead the hegemon into war. The 1992 American
Defense Planning Guidance, created by the Pentagon and National Security Council to plan
Department of Defense priorities for current operations and future possibilities, and the 1997
piece by the Project for the New American Century described America’s responsibilities as
hegemon. The literature aligned with these responsibilities of supporting allies, challenging
hostile regimes, promoting freedom, and building an international society of security. 114
University of Calgary U.S. foreign policy graduate student Chris Langille argued in 2008 that
democracy is the inevitable endpoint to which all societies progress. Though some believe this to
be true, they do not think that militaristic force is justified in generating those ends. However,
Langille cited sociologist Seymour Lipset in declaring that when obstacles, such as authoritarian
leaders, obstruct the progress towards democracy those leaders must be removed by force and
their people liberated and such military force is benign.115
By the time of President George W. Bush, those in senior roles had the president’s ear
and were pushing towards an invasion of Iraq. It is easy to label Vice President Cheney as
hawkish for war, but he was but one of many who sought war in Iraq. The explicit goals of the
1992 and 1997 documents were removing Hussein from power, establishing military bases in
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Iraq, and taking control of its oil reserves. U.S. citizens, and citizens of many other places around
the world, repeated the rallying cry of no blood for oil. Those opposed to the invasion on this
basis were opposed to Vice President Dick Cheney’s ties to the energy company Haliburton,
with whom he sat as the CEO prior to serving President George W. Bush. During his time as
CEO, Haliburton inked contracts with Iraq worth an estimated $73 million. 116 A subsidiary
company of Haliburton was subsequently awarded a contract with the Army Corps of Engineers
to restore Iraqi Oil following the invasion. 117 President George W. Bush was on board with each
piece of the plan. Philosophy Professor Douglas Kellner explained how well before the attacks of
11 September, a 2000 report titled “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and
Resources for a New American Century” made the rounds in policy circles. The report was put
together by the think-tank PNAC for the Bush administration officials, including Cheney,
Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz. The report pushed firmly for U.S. hegemony over the world and
seizing the Middle East and its oil reserves.118 As hegemon, President George H.W. Bush argued
that America had control of the “New World Order,” allowing it to exercise military might and
act as the world’s police force. It does not require much imagination to see how President
George W. Bush may have sought to unseat Hussein to tidy up his father’s unfinished family
business and remove a perceived threat to the United States and its allies.119 One area on U.S.
foreign policy where the literature is bountiful is the analysis of President George W. Bush’s
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stance on the issue. This piece of the Iraq invasion puzzle is vital because it was used to convince
other politicians, other nations, and the American people that an attack on the nation of Iraq was
justified and necessary.
Political Scientist Ronald R. Krebs and Political Scientist Ph.D. candidate Jennifer K.
Lobasz argued that the legitimacy of the invasion of Iraq was made possible by framing the
attacks of 9/11 as making the War on Terror necessary. The scholars continued that
understanding the discourse of the War on Terror, and its crafting by the administration, shows
how it established the U.S. as hegemonic. Furthermore, they argue that the discourse of the War
on Terror made it more difficult for Democrats to oppose the war and the invasion of Iraq which
followed. The depiction of President Hussein as the next iteration of Adolf Hitler and a terrorist
within the War on Terror made it difficult to speak against President George W. Bush in his
march towards military action in Iraq. The rhetoric of President George W. Bush and his
administration shaped a belief among U.S. citizens that Hussein played a role in the attacks of 11
September and framed his regime as part of an Axis of Evil. The hegemonic position that
developed was not a unification of all U.S. policymakers but was propelled forward by the
Republican party at the time. Republicans had a better track record in the eyes of the public in
handling security issues and their talking points regarding President Hussein and his depiction as
a terrorist and the world’s next Hitler became the dominant discourse over Democrats who
opposed military action.120
Krebs and Lobasz suggested that the U.S.’ actions as world hegemon called to question
what the nation had done in the Middle East and the attacks of 9/11 as a response by extremists.
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The United States had financially and politically supported oppressive dictators in the Middle
East. They also noted that the assistance given to Israel caused death and harm to Palestinians for
decades. They argued that the U.S. military response towards countries as part of the War on
Terror did little more than depict the United States as making an impulsive play for “imperialist
expansion.”121 Although the U.S. did spend considerable time occupying both Afghanistan and
Iraq, both conflicts have recently ended. The U.S. arguably left these nations destabilized and
their citizens impacted by the United States War on Terror. It does not appear that the U.S. hoped
for imperialist expansion, but the United States hoped to establish and expand democratic and
capitalist ideals, neither of which bore much fruit.
The U.S. seemed to weaken as the world’s hegemonic power following the War on
Terror. Part of this is likely from the pre-emptive invasion of Iraq based upon claims that never
materialized (and the forever war that followed). The W. Bush-era generation of U.S. foreign
policymakers established the precedent that pre-emptive war may be used by future U.S.
presidents or even by other nation-states who choose to launch a war of pre-emption because of a
perceived threat that may not exist.
The next chapter examines the mainstream media's role in its implicit support of the
invasion of Iraq, its opposition once the war began and the pretexts for war seemed
unsubstantiated, and its role in reporting the war as it unfolded.
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Chapter Two: The Media’s Reinforcement of Rhetoric
This chapter analyzes the media's tacit role, by uncritically repeating the administration’s
claims, in building support for President George W. Bush's war rhetoric and military action in
Iraq. The second section of the chapter will examine the unintended consequences of the war
rhetoric on U.S. citizens of Middle Eastern ancestry. The third section will address how other
government agencies were used to bolster support among media outlets in other nations that the
U.S. sought to influence. Finally, I compare how field journalists and their parent companies
reported on the Vietnam War Conflict as opposed to their coverage of the invasion of Iraq in
2003. First, this chapter reviews the media's role in repeating the rhetoric in favor of armed
conflict in Iraq.

More Than Simple Talking Points
English Professor Richard Grusin argued that in the modern era of media, the mission of
print and television journalism was to state that news is constantly breaking and foster fear that
another important event is on the horizon.122 Communications Professor Mahmoud Eid declares
that the mainstream media is a ruthless yet profitable business that benefits from opposing views
on an issue. It is common for the media machine to sensationalize stories to seize the readers'
interests. The attacks of 9/11 served the media and allowed for non-stop coverage of the
terrorists and the continued threat that they posed. The media coverage may have inadvertently
promoted global terrorism while provoking fear within the U.S. citizenry. 123
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Professor of Communication and Women and Gender Studies Kimberly Powell argued
that when 9/11 occurred it transformed the U.S.'s response to the terrorist threat and legitimized
the War on Terror. By framing Iraq as an evil opposite of the freedom-loving U.S., the Bush
administration depicted the invasion of Iraq as the morally superior U.S. versus the wicked
Middle Eastern, specifically Muslim, “other.” Because terrorist actions are shocking by design,
the activities of terrorists quickly capture the media's attention and account for a considerable
amount of time in the twenty-four-hour news cycle. The fear invoked by the media in telling the
story of terror has the power to reshape public behaviors, such as travel and even in-person
attendance at workplaces.124 Shortly after the attacks of 11 September, fifty-three per cent of
respondents, all of whom were U.S. residents, stated that they had changed their plans and even
day-to-day routine.125 Roughly ninety per cent of respondents, from a pool of U.S. residents,
declared that the possibility of additional terror attacks created fear, which drove people to seek
further updates, sometimes even from celebrity talk show hosts like Dave Letterman and Jay
Leno. The response to this fear was a supportive populace behind the Bush administration to
devote more time and money to the War on Terror. 126
President George W. Bush's public campaign for the invasion of Iraq began on 12
September 2002 when he started making explicit connections between Iraq, terrorism, and
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WMDs in public speeches.127 Political Science Professor Anthony DiMaggio argued that the
rhetoric explored the dichotomy of the fear invoked by terrorism and the hope offered by the
administration and the other nations who would join the United States in the War on Terror.
These messages from the president were spread by an acquiescent and unquestioning mass media
to U.S. citizens still impacted by the horrors of terrorism on U.S. soil and recovering from the
effects. The Bush administration exerted their power in defining the boundaries of what would
be propagated in the mass media’s report of the incident and the government’s response. 128 The
media and the executive branch regularly work together to simplify complicated issues for easier
comprehension by a broad citizenry and both of these agents can determine what is important to
the public, how it is discussed, and which facts are relevant.
DiMaggio argued that in 2002-2003, President George W. Bush launched "one of the
largest pro-war public relations campaigns in history."129 Although it is hard to pin down who
led the public relations campaign for the Bush administration’s goals in Iraq, it likely involved
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer to a significant degree based upon his shaping of the
press’ understanding of the goals of President George W. Bush. For example, a 12 October 2002
article in the New York Times identified Press Secretary Fleischer as the person who clarified
how the U.S. military would act if Iraq was invaded. Fleischer also hypothesized in the article
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that the U.S. would not be viewed as occupiers but liberators. This echoed the relations that the
United States had with Japan following World War II.130
The Bush administration's public relations campaign was a marked success in building
support for the anti-terror agenda and Iraq's threat to the nation and worldwide democracy. A
repeated talking point by the administration was the legality of pre-emptive action under existing
international law and in response to violations of U.N. Security Council Resolutions that were
relics of Desert Storm in 1990-1991. The Bush administration used U.N. Resolution 1441 of
November 2002 to bolster its case. This resolution gave Iraq's President Saddam Hussein one last
chance to comply with earlier disarmament resolutions. President George W. Bush's public
speeches continued to hammer on Hussein's failure to comply. Although the 2003 U.N. weapons
inspectors, led by Hans Blix, questioned the Bush administration's allegations that Iraq posed a
threat, they were not certain. This uncertain possibility allowed the Bush administration to
continue asserting that Iraq posed a nuclear threat. It was the obligation of the U.S. to act preemptively before that threat materialized. 131
The Bush administration repeatedly used the threats of chemical and biological warfare
(CBW) tied to Iraq to provoke fear in U.S. citizens. For example, Bush seized the opportunity to
speak at the U.N. on 12 September 2002, where he promoted the significant threat:
In 1991, the Iraqi regime agreed to destroy and stop developing all weapons of
mass destruction…Iraq has broken every aspect of this fundamental pledge. The
regime [has] admitted to producing tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and
other deadly biological agents for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs, and
aircraft spray tanks. U.N. inspectors believe Iraq has produced two to four times
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the amount of biological agents it declared…Iraq is expanding and improving
facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons. 132
It is not clear if the status of the biological agents was correct at the time of the speech but by
late 2003 proof of a biological weapons program had not surfaced. Furthermore, experts stated
that if Iraq did have a biological weapons program at the time, it did not have the means to
deliver the biological weapons. 133 Bush argued that the threat Iraq posed was not limited to
nuclear weapons, and Hussein’s past use of CBWs gave the administration a base to argue that a
continued threat from CBWs was plausible. By repeating the numerous violations that Iraq held
over from Desert Storm, the Bush administration drove home fear and the hope that the United
States offered in providing a more secure world.
The media covered the Bush administration in part by reporting on his public speeches
that would stream live on air and excerpts were used in later coverage of the appearances.
Following the speech to the U.N., Bush spoke in October 2002 in Cincinnati, Ohio, at one event
that was planned to increase Republican voter turnout for the midterm elections in the U.S. In
this speech, President George W. Bush gave an example of Hussein's aggressions towards one of
Hussein’s enemies, Iran. He recalled that Hussein "ordered chemical attacks on Iran, and on
more than forty villages in his own country."134 These attacks resulted in at least 20,000
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casualties. The efficiency of Hussein's warfare was given by British intelligence, which indicated
that once Hussein gave the order to launch a CBW attack, it would only require forty-five
minutes to execute. Although this intelligence was based upon spotty weapons inspections up to
this point, the threat of a swift attack by Iraq furthered the fear that the Bush administration
promoted to the public and perpetuated the habits of most of the U.S. populace to watch the news
to learn more about the next threat facing the United States. According to Gallup polling, only
ten per cent of respondents said that they felt very satisfied with regard to the nation’s security
from terrorism in 2002, with forty one per cent saying that they were somewhat satisfied. When
polling was conducted again in 2004, after the invasion of Iraq, still only nineteen per cent stated
that they were very satisfied with their security from terrorism, and fifty one percent responded
that they were somewhat satisfied. Looking at those who were somewhat satisfied, the second
highest categorization of safety in this polling, you see a ten point jump following the invasion
and I believe this is tied to the idea that President George W. Bush had eliminated the threat
supposedly presented by President Hussein.135
The Bush administration was doing well in selling the threat of CBW at this point and
then ratcheted up the threat by noting in his 2003 State of the Union address, covered by all news
networks and broadcast channels in the U.S. in addition to reporting by newspaper reports the
next day, that intelligence showed that Hussein had developed mobile weapons labs. Gen. Powell
later repeated this threat in his February 2003 U.N. address. The ability to secretly mobilize
weapons laboratories implied that finding proof of Iraq's illegal weapons cache would make the
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job of U.N. weapons inspectors more difficult.136 News agencies, such as NPR, reported on the
State of the Union with special coverage the same day. While NPR reported on the event, there
was no critical analysis by the news agency. 137 Similarly, a New York Times article published the
day after the State of the Union did little to challenge President Bush’s talking points but instead
selectively contrasted the president’s speech to other historically significant U.S. presidential
speeches.138
However, the day after President George W. Bush's 7 October 2002 speech in Cincinnati,
Ohio, the CIA publicly released a document that declared that President Hussein was not a
current threat to the United States. Still, the CIA document noted that Hussein could resort to the
use of CBW if he felt threatened. In a matter of days following the release of the CIA's
document, the major news outlets Newsweek and MSNBC declared that the intelligence photos
presented by the Bush administration "were not convincing."139 The pushback that the CIA gave
to President George W. Bush regarding President Hussein and Iraq was confirmed after the
invasion of Iraq in a news article by Bob Drogin and Greg Miller titled “CIA Chief Saw No
Imminent Threat in Iraq.” In the article, the journalists report that CIA Director Tenet never
supported the Bush administration’s labeling of Hussein as an imminent threat. Not only is it
important to recognize that the nation’s main intelligence agency did not see the justification of
invading Iraq but it is also key that without an imminent threat, there could be no logical pre-
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emption. This once again makes the military action in Iraq a preventative war, as discussed in
Chapter One. Furthermore, the threat of Iraq amassing chemical and biological weapons could
not be supported by the CIA.140 However, the Bush administration’s public relations campaign
regularly worked with the media to bolster support for the Iraqi invasion.
On 28 January 2003, just months before the strike occurred, the New York Times ran an
article titled “White House Expected to Disclose Evidence of Iraqi Threat.” In the article, the
Times supported the Bush administration’s plans by announcing that the White House planned to
reveal further information about hidden weapons and Iraqi links to terrorism, while also noting
the international opposition to military action in Iraq. The White House spoke on background,
where no names were given about the upcoming disclosure, on how Hussein had hidden
weapons and further information tying Iraq to al Qaeda were found. The article also disclosed
that White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer was ready to act against Iraq without another
U.N. resolution. Despite this fight in the media to win support at home and abroad, the Times
also cited Gallup polling that support for President George W. Bush’s foreign policy had
dropped to between fifty and fifty-nine per cent.141 Without the support of the media, the
president's rhetoric on the issue faltered in some circles. The framing of the president's rhetoric
determined how in-depth the ideology permeated the public sphere.
It is interesting to compare the U.S. media’s portrayal of the case for the invasion of Iraq
with how sound the intelligence seemed in the eyes of the British media. The U.S. article, from
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the New York Times, was titled “With Few Variations, Top Bush Advisers Present their Case
Against Iraq.” The article reviews recent public appearances by members of the Bush
administration, including Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld, and their
presentation of evidence supporting an invasion of Iraq for its violations of the U.N. Security
Council Resolutions and the threat of their stockpile of chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons posed to the U.S. and worldwide democracy. Interestingly, Colin Powell legitimized
pre-emption and prevention as strategies that have existed all along but was given a different sort
of attention after 9/11. In the article you see talking points on numerous major political news
shows and a passive acceptance and regurgitation of all of these talking points in one of the
United States’ respected newspapers.142
By contrast, a British newspaper, The Times, discussed intelligence regarding Iraq’s
nuclear capabilities presented in support of the invasion of Iraq in the 14 March 2002 article
titled “Iraq’s Nuclear Bomb Ability Still a Mystery.” The article stated that Iraq’s nuclear
capabilities remained a mystery to U.S. intelligence agencies just days before the American
invasion. The article cited intelligence drawn from the two main British intelligence agencies,
MI6 and GCHQ. The article also cited a report from the IAEA that there was no indication that
Iraq was successful in acquiring weapons grade uranium on the black market or that it was
successful in producing more than a few grams of fissile material on its own. Furthermore, the
IAEA never found a blueprint for a nuclear weapon, though they remained convinced that
President Hussein must have had one. Comparing these two articles side-by-side, it was easy to
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see how readily the U.S. media supported President George W. Bush’s rhetoric versus how other
news agencies challenged the Bush administration’s talking points, despite Britain being a
member of the Coalition of the Willing. 143
The Toronto Star published an article on 18 June 2002 titled “War on Terror Little to do
with Terror.” In the article, the author is quick to remind readers that there is no intelligence
linking the present-day Iraq to al Qaeda or 9/11. Although the author noted that the Bush
administration stated that Hussein was amassing WMDs, the author cited a former member of
the inspections team in declaring that there is no truth in this matter. The author noted the
hypocrisy of the United States in taking action against states with WMDs as the U.S. and other
leading nations all have WMD stockpiles. In fact, the threat from the recent anthrax attacks were
connected back to a U.S. military laboratory.
The author of the Toronto Star article noted that the war in Afghanistan did little to
prevent terrorism but in fact made terrorism a more significant threat. I concur with the author
that the events of 9/11 gave the administration a blank check to act globally in the war on terror,
to the extent that it would even permit preventative conflict with Iraq. 144 Although Canada did
not participate in the initial invasion of Iraq it did help with the reconstruction efforts and
training of the Iraqi police force. Despite the Canadian government’s participation in the later
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debacle in Iraq, the media in the country did not hold back in its critique of President George W.
Bush and his administration in their attempts to legitimize the invasion.
Media and public affairs Professor Robert Entman argued that “media framing”
highlights a portion of reality and makes it noteworthy. Because most of the mainstream U.S.
media were uncritical of the president's argument for the invasion of Iraq, the framing of all
Muslims (including U.S. citizens) in a negative light occurred due to their depiction as the
“other.” Kimberly Powell argued that the media coverage of terrorism casts Muslims and Islam
in a particularly negative light. The repetition of this framing guides the consumer towards the
belief that "Muslims are terrorists." 145

Islamophobia in the U.K. and U.S.
The "Green Menace,” so named because green is associated with Islam, became the new
threat facing America in the shadow of the Cold War. The 9/11 Commission Report by the U.S.
Congress, published 22 July 2004, acknowledged that the roots of Muslim extremism and the
hate that groups like al Qaeda represented were tied to the religion of Islam and did not separate
politics from religion.146 It is important to note that the 9/11 Commission Report urged that Islam
should not have been targeted as the enemy of the U.S. and should not be lumped to identify all
Islamic persons as terrorists. The report urged tolerance of Islam while preventing further

R. M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a fractured paradigm” in Journal of
Communication, 43 (4), pp. 51-58, cited in Powell, “Framing Islam: An Analysis of U.S. Media
Coverage of Terrorism Since 9/11,” pp. 93-94.
146 Todd H. Green, “9/11, The War on Terror, and the Rise of Political Islamophobia,” in The
Fear of Islam: An Introduction to Islamophobia in the West (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press,
2019), pp. 109-117, https://muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.lib.uwm.edu/book/39716.
145

72

terrorist attacks from Islamic extremists. 147 Professor of Religion Todd Green declared that when
politicians label Islam as being tied to violent measures like terrorism, they have abandoned
reason and have delved into the territory of Islamophobia. Even notable editorialist Thomas
Friedman wrote that no Muslim cleric or religious body denounced the terrorist attacks launched
by al Qaeda. However, this statement was quickly proved false as his newspaper, the New York
Times, ran a full-page proclamation by notable Muslim leaders that denounced the attacks. 148 If
the stereotypes and fear directed towards Muslims had permeated the minds of politicians and
the news media, what was the result on the greater U.K. and U.S. citizenry?
Media culture and communications Professor Amir Saeed argued that Islamophobia was
not limited to the U.S. as he dealt with hate directed towards him because of his religious identity
within his home, Great Britain. Islamophobia existed prior to 9/11, as proven by the United
Nation’s recognition that an accord on racism was necessary. The New York Times wrote an
article on 9 September 2001 (two days before the attack in New York City) about the U.N.
accord agreed upon at a conference in Durban, South Africa. The U.N. members recognized that
racism and intolerance had a long history of ending in significant violations of human rights and
becoming tragedies. The accord recognized the groups repeatedly targeted by intolerance and
violence, the Jewish people, those from Islamic countries, and the Palestinians. Those that signed
the accord agreed to oppose racism and counter intolerance based on religious or cultural
backgrounds. Recognizing historical wrongs, the accord identified the Holocaust and the transAtlantic slave trade that must never be permitted to occur again. The necessity to develop a
multilateral accord against racism in the United Nations speaks to the existence of these
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conditions in developed countries like the United States and developing countries worldwide
well before the War on Terror. 149
Saeed wrote that the hatred of Islam throughout the Western world manifested in physical
confrontations and verbal intimidation. Saeed also mentioned the development of far-right
political groups with explicit anti-Muslim political positions and the creation of groups like the
English Defense League that takes the hate to street-level, operating within Muslim
communities. At the time of Saeed's writing (2011), although Muslims only represented three per
cent of the citizenry in the U.K., they accounted for forty-four per cent of all victims of the racial
violence within the state. The representation of Islam as a religion of violence in early political
rhetoric by President George W. Bush and his close ally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, calls
to question how the selling of the invasion of Iraq by way of the mainstream media's partnership
influenced the perspectives of both the U.S. and the U.K. populace. 150
In 2002, the organization Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report detailing the
impact of Islamophobia in the United States following the depiction of Muslims as the enemy in
politics and the media. The report stated that one of the side-effects of the 9/11 attacks was the
sharp rise in hate crimes. 151 The hate crimes ranged from public harassment to assault and even
murder. The notable increase in these crimes primarily occurred between 11 September 2001 and
December 2001. The increase in these crimes was seventeen-fold compared to pre-9/11 metrics
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from the FBI, moving from twenty-eight anti-Muslim crimes in 2000 to over 600, by some
agency's records, at the end of 2001. Between 1996-2000, the reports of hate crimes to the FBI
had been relatively low from year to year. However, even after its peak year in 2001, the
subsequent years from 2002 to 2007 showed that hate crimes remained significantly higher than
the numbers in the years leading to 9/11. 152 The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
reported 1,717 anti-Muslim acts of discrimination from 11 September 2001 until the end of
February 2002. Even within Chicago alone, there were fifty-one hate crimes in the three months
after 9/11. This increase in hate crimes represented a nearly thirteen fold increase. Chicago
wasn't alone with record hate-crime numbers in this period. Similar patterns were evident in Los
Angeles County and throughout Florida. 153 The report showed that discrimination and
Islamophobic bias were not limited to New York City but experienced by communities
nationwide.
The most recent data from the FBIs 2019 Hate Crime Statistics reported 176 incidents of
anti-Islamic bias as the single motivation for criminal acts. Thankfully, the number of antiIslamic bias crimes has decreased significantly since the United States’ peak reporting of these
incidents in 2001. These incidents represented 13.3 per cent of the religiously motivated hate
crimes in 2019. The two most common locations for hate crimes based upon religion to occur
were near the victim’s residences or homes and closely behind that were offenses near places of
worship.154 The group Muslim Advocates responded to the 2020 release of the FBI’s 2019 Hate
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Crime Statistics by stating that although there were more anti-Islamic hate crimes than any year
since 2008, they believed that this did not represent the full scope of the data. Their basis for this
claim is that there is no requirement for law enforcement agencies to report hate crimes to the
federal government and many victims do not report the offenses themselves. Muslim Advocates
encourages the U.S. Congress to pass legislation to improve comprehensive hate crime
reporting.155 They encouraged the passage of the Jabara-Heyer NO HATE Act. The legislation
was introduced in the senate in June 2019 though it failed to gain traction and was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary, where it stalled.156 An additional bill was introduced in the Senate
in March 2021 with the aim of making reporting of hate crimes easier and more comprehensive,
but it too did not get enough support to progress past the introduction to the legislative body.157
Discrimination was not only demonstrated through intimidation or violence but also as
employment discrimination. By May 2002, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) received 488 grievances of employment discrimination directly tied to
Islamophobia and 9/11. Of those groups targeted by Islamophobia, it was not uncommon for
them to be stereotyped. Still, the Department of Transportation (DOT) investigated 111
complaints of excessive screening processes due to people’s ethnic or religious identity. Some of
these complaints resulted in harassment or being refused from boarding an aircraft. The HRW
report also contains polling results regarding how Islamophobia resulted in criminal and non-
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criminal incidents within their communities. One polling result in the report stated that 48 per
cent of Muslim-Americans polled by CAIR believed that their quality of life had decreased after
9/11. Despite Islamophobia resulting in greater acts of hate directed towards Muslim-Americans
by others, the Muslim-American community polled stated that seventy-nine per cent of those
surveyed experienced a kind act from friends or co-workers of other faiths. This polling reveals
that, although there were numerous instances of kindness directed towards Muslim-Americans
after 9/11, the overall phobia and stereotyping negatively affected the Muslim-American
communities nationwide.158 However, the impact on Muslim-American citizens was only a part
of the story as the media, to a great extent, repeated much of the president's talking points as the
Bush administration sought to convince the U.S. populace of the threat Iraq posed to the United
States and democracy as a whole. Although freedom of religion is a pillar defining the aims of
the founders of the United States, in practice, the Islamic faith and all Muslim-Americans were
redefined as terrorists after 9/11, and the War on Terror highlights the defining of these
individuals as the “other,” or non-American on a prima facie basis. 159
An oral history described the circumstances that surrounded those tied to the Islamic faith
who lived in the United States following 11 September 2001. A girl named Adama Bah, who
lived in East Harlem, New York awoke on 24 March 2005 surrounded by federal agents. In the
early morning raid, FBI agents arrested her and her father, Mamadou Bah, and transported them
to separate detention facilities. Adama was detained for six weeks before being released. Her
father was released, only to immediately be deported to Guinea, Africa. Before Adama’s release,
the U.S. threatened her with deportation as well. When 9/11 occurred, Adama attended an
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Islamic boarding school in Buffalo, New York and was shook by the attacks that day and was
disturbed when her teacher told her that because of the attacks, there might be hate against
Muslims. Adama recalled being disturbed that all Muslims would receive blame for what a small
group did, which she had no association with before in her life. By pure coincidence, Adama
Osama shared part of her name with the 9/11 mastermind and overshadowed her as an
individual.160
Roughly one month after 9/11, Adama boarded a plane for New York to celebrate
Ramadan with her family. She was dressed in conservative Islamic apparel covering most of her
body. Adama remembered the pointing, the fear on people’s faces, and she had a fear of being
attacked. She experienced these reactions without the awareness of the hate crimes towards
Muslims, although she was in school after 9/11 when someone threw a rock through the Islamic
school’s window. Adama felt the intrusiveness of the additional screenings at the airport, and
later discovered that her bags were pulled aside for additional screening. Adama described the
treatment of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as especially hostile, which
seemed standard treatment from all aspects of the airline travel that day. Racism, hatred, and
curse words were slung at her, while also being derided as a member of the Taliban. 161
The morning of 24 March 2005 was when things changed from racist remarks from other
individuals in public to a personal attack by law enforcement, as mentioned at the beginning of
this oral history account. That morning, agents from the FBI, Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and local police entered her apartment and corralled the family, while shouting that they
were going to deport the entire family as their belongings were turned upside-down in search of
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something unknown. Adama and her father were handcuffed and transported in the same car to a
detention center in the city. Adama was placed in a cell, though it had glass instead of bars like is
traditionally seen in a jail cell. Adama was interrogated, which is when she learned that she was
not in the U.S. legally, which disturbed her deeply. However, Adama’s father stressed the
importance of her avoiding deportation to Guinea because she would be forcibly circumcised.
This cultural tradition is not unique to Guinea but was the main reason that Adama’s parents left
the country for the United States after their daughters were born.162
An FBI agent interrogated Adama once again but this time the topic was not regarding
immigration but terrorism. The agent claimed that a girl from Adama’s mosque, whom she had
seen in the detention facility that day, was part of a religious study group tied to someone wanted
by the FBI. The FBI agent turned her over to a male Secret Service agent who asked Adama
about her feelings towards President George W. Bush. Adama was candid and said that she did
not like him. Adama then recalled that the Secret Service agent became aggressive when asking
her about her reasons for covering so much of her body when women were trending towards
more revealing clothing. Adama stated that it was merely freedom of choice to wear coverings.
The Secret Service agent then disclosed that her acquaintance from the mosque had listed her as
a potential suicide bomber. Adama was shocked but the interrogations continued off and on.
When Adama was handcuffed with the woman who the agents claimed identified her as a
terrorist, Adama discovered that they had told this acquaintance that Adama had signed this girl
up as a potential suicide bomber. The agents were hoping to play one girl off of the other. 163
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Adama and her acquaintance Tashnuba were then transported to a detention center in
Pennsylvania by the FBI. Once the pair arrived at the detention center in Pennsylvania Adama
was repeatedly stripped searched, which was very difficult for her to endure because of her
religious modesty and a tradition of covering the majority of her body. She was then told to dress
in a blue sweatsuit but was initially permitted to take her head scarf with her until a supervisor
noticed it and removed it from her possession. 164 Every morning the detainees were supposed to
salute the American flag but Adama said, “[Expletive] the American flag. I’m not saluting it,”
while keeping her hands to her side during the Pledge of Allegiance. 165 Adama reminded the
guards that they had told her that she was not American, so why would she salute the American
flag?166
Adama was detained for four weeks before her first appearance before a magistrate by
video conference. After a story was published in the New York Times the girls received increased
derogatory remarks from the guards who saw them as terrorists, and the pair received increased
strip searches and increased racism. At the beginning of the fourth week of Adama’s detention,
she was able to see her lawyer and her family. Her father remained detained in New Jersey
before his deportation. Adama was eventually released to her family on the condition that she
wear an ankle bracelet. 167 Adama was released after six and a half weeks in detention and she
recalled that when she was released to federal agents, her guard said to the agents, “Arrest that
[expletive] [n-word] terrorist.”168

164

Malek, Patriot Act, pp. 36-38.
Malek, Patriot Act, p. 39.
166 Malek, Patriot Act, p. 39.
167 Malek, Patriot Act, pp. 39-41.
168 Malek, Patriot Act, p. 41.
165

80

The government punished Adama by having her wear an ankle bracelet for three years
while also adhering to curfew hours. The ankle bracelet prevented Adama from seeing her father
because of the distance she was limited to travel from home. With her father gone, Adama was
forced to work to support her family instead of returning to school to continue her education.
Adama wore the ankle bracelet until she received asylum because of the forced genital mutilation
she faced if she was deported to her home country of Guinea. As a further insult, Adama
discovered that her detention at the hands of the government placed her on a no fly list. She was
not able to regain her ability to travel by air until she sued Attorney General Eric Holder, FBI
Director Robert Mueller, and Director of the Terrorist Screening Center Timothy Healy.169 The
story of the detention of the two girls was carried by the New York Times in an article published
on 7 May 2005 titled “Elation in Harlem as Girl Held in Terror Inquiry is Released.”
The New York Times article recounted some points of Adama’s oral history of the ordeal
and also noted that the case was shrouded in secrecy. Despite the efforts of the newspaper, their
journalist had difficulty in uncovering information about either Adama or Tashnuba for quite
some time. Even after Adama’s case was concluded, her attorney remained under a gag order by
the judge and not able to discuss much of what occurred. In the article, the journalist uncovered
that though many of her friends from school had tried to send letters of support, they were
informed that Adama was not permitted to receive any correspondence. Tashnuba, whose name
was not disclosed in the article because of her status as a minor, was negotiating with the
government for permission to leave the U.S. for their home country. 170 This oral history is one of
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many from Muslim residents of the United States in the shadow of 9/11. I chose this particular
oral history to illustrate that even years after 9/11, Islamic intolerance existed to the point that
federal agents were still pursuing leads based on stereotypes of the threat Muslims supposedly
posed to the U.S.

More Than Simple Talking Points – Part II
On 12 September 2002, President George W. Bush ratcheted his call for military
aggression against Iraq. In a speech just after the first anniversary of the attacks, he stated that
"Today, we turn to the urgent duty of protecting other lives."171 President George W. Bush
claimed that President Hussein had been and still was providing succor to terrorists, particularly
the al Qaeda terror network. 172 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reported to the U.S.
Senate’s Armed Services Committee on 19 September 2002 that Hussein could place "sleeper
cells armed with biological weapons to attack us from within—and then deny any knowledge or
connection to the attacks."173 This is yet another example of the Bush administration’s
amplification of fear amongst the general population. Bush and his administration regularly
asserted connections between Iraq, al Qaeda, and the terror attacks of 9/11. The administration
made these claims in speeches time after time because most U.S. citizens were disinterested in
politics and needed consistent reminders of the alleged threat Hussein posed, according to
DiMaggio.174 Interestingly, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice claimed that the
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absence of proof of the threat that Iraq posed was evidence of an imminent threat. Rice expressed
that no firm evidence was needed as there will always remain some level of uncertainty while
attempting to determine the current state of Iraq’s nuclear program, but the people must not wait
for the mushroom cloud to appear on the horizon. 175
As the Bush administration sought an explicit authorization from congress for military
action in Iraq, there was a division among some Democrats in the legislature. At the time, the
Bush administration continued to utilize the fear of future terrorist attacks to build consent for
the invasion of Iraq, which would have been difficult to do in the pre-9/11 political environment.
The administration strategically used the mainstream media to bolster its rhetoric with the
dichotomy of fear and hope. The positioning of hope as opposite to fear provokes two thoughts
for me. First, the Bush administration did little to provide safety to the U.S. people and its allies,
even after Operation Enduring Freedom began. The argument that a lack of certainty regarding
safety, as given by Condoleezza Rice, seemed to make safety impossible because leaders and
U.S. residents would never know of all of the threats posed against the United States. Instead,
hope was the next best thing that they could offer. Secondly, hope has theological ties to the
Christian faith that many of these U.S. leaders relied heavily upon but also something that they
identified was lacking in the Axis of Evil countries of Iraq, for example. The press and its
journalist agents relied upon official statements by both the Republicans and Democrats. The
reliance upon the official positions of the Republicans and Democrats placed Iraq as the next
threat in the War on Terror. The October 2002 congressional resolution in support of military
action in Iraq received broad support from a significant number of Democrats in the Senate,
though most House Democrats opposed the resolution. As a result, the New York Times wrote
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that there was a vital split within the Democratic Party about whether there was sufficient
evidence to authorize military force, which was a concern voiced by the CIA and its director,
George Tenet. As was stated in Chapter One, the release of the Downing Street Memo on 23 July
2003 depicted the debate about whether or not to invade Iraq as having already been decided
well before.176 Though some Democrats were opposed to the war, it seems that they did not put
up much of a fight against President George W. Bush’s movement towards war. Much of the
disagreement amongst Democrats revolved upon how to wage war, the acceptable costs, and
what to expect as far as the duration of the war, instead of pushing harder against an invasion of
Iraq.177
DiMaggio argued that the editorials published in the major newspapers framed the
discussion of Iraq's threat in other media outlets. However, DiMaggio acknowledged that support
amongst the newspapers varied in degree and enthusiasm for the military action. Although I
argue that some of the larger newspapers were passive in accepting and distributing the rhetoric
of the Bush administration, that was not the case for all media. While the Washington Post
mostly repeated President George W. Bush's rhetoric and supported the war, the New York Times
reiterated the talking points of congressional Democrats questioning when it would be the
appropriate time to strike the nation. In response to Colin Powell's report to the U.N. (2002), the
Washington Post stated unequivocally that no one could doubt that Hussein possessed WMDs
and even went a step further by declaring that Hussein was deceitful and manipulative in
dealings with U.N. weapons inspectors. Even once the war began, the Washington Post ran a
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story urging U.S. citizens that there continued to be a need to act in support of peace in the
Middle East because of the threat that Iraq posed to its neighbors, the region, and the globe.
President Bush stated, and his administration officials reiterated, that Iraq would serve as an
example to the rest of the globe that some rogue states have CBWs or WMDs and should be
feared.178 Stories amplifying the president's rhetorical argument on Iraq continued in the
Washington Post and supplemented the fear of terror that the Bush administration desired the
U.S. citizenry to embrace.
Database searches of smaller newspapers, like the Santa Cruz [California] Sentinel, show
that the issue of Iraq received press attention even in smaller cities in the U.S. In a 28 September
2002 article, the “Facts of Iraq” addressed the Bush administration’s talking points. The article,
which began on the front page resumed near the end of the pages in section A. The pieces written
on Iraq in the Santa Cruz Sentinel actually originated with the Associated Press wire service and
one of their journalists, Calvin Woodward. The article discussed that although the Bush
administration had repeated claims that Iraq is tied to al Qaeda, there was no consensus about
that claim among intelligence experts. The article poked holes in the Bush administration’s
intelligence claims, which persisted in some form leading up to the invasion. 179 This article
showed that even though the mass media could have done a better job challenging President
George W. Bush and his staff in their run to war, there were occasional pieces published by the
Associated Press that ran in various newspapers across the country with small bits of resistance
against the official rhetoric of the Bush staff.
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Former journalist and Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Patrick
M. Holt wrote an opinion piece for the Christian Science Monitor that was published 7
November 2002. In the editorial, Holt revealed that the intelligence was fixed upon the policy of
invading Iraq by this point. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld became agitated with the intelligence
the CIA had reported to the White House regarding Iraq. As a result, Rumsfeld established his
own intelligence analysis unit that would independently review intelligence from the longestablished network of military and civilian intelligence sources. However, this fixing the
intelligence to match the rhetoric was not new to the White House as the same sort of activities
occurred with President Johnson’s 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic. Mr. Holt agrees
that President Hussein had previously gassed his own people but there was no proof that Hussein
was making chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. I concur with Holt in that it is disturbing
that President George W. Bush claimed that the threat from Hussein was imminent but refused to
allow others to review the intelligence gathered that (supposedly) supported the Bush
administration’s claims.180
Although Holt conceded that certain intelligence can be sensitive and restricted to protect
the informant, there are also times when intelligence isn’t disclosed to the public because the
intelligence is weak or nonexistent. Holt explained that this treatment of intelligence supporting a
claim made by the White House had been very common during the Cold War, but it resulted in
an independent agency conducting intelligence review and providing judgement not biased in
favor of the Department of Defense (DoD) or the CIA. Holt also stated that part of the problem
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with the DoD and CIA is that they have a longstanding rivalry that is largely due to funding
differences. Although the CIA is charged with leading the U.S. intelligence gathering, most of
their funding is held by the DoD. Furthermore, the DoD does a great deal of intelligence
gathering, including operating and analyzing spy satellites and debriefing military service
members after operations. 181 This rivalry only serves the interests of the individual intelligence
agencies but prevents the fullest picture of sensitive situations like the weapons status of Iraq.
While intelligence was reviewed behind closed doors, the constant flow of new information, with
sometimes questionable verifiability, continued on the cable news networks such as Fox, CNN,
and MSNBC. The legacy of this conflict between intelligence agencies was the responsibility of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), founded on 1 March 2003, in coordinating
intelligence sharing with the goal of preventing shortfalls such as occurred with the attacks of
9/11.
The twenty-four-hour cable news networks focused on terrorism for some time after 9/11,
and reported the Department of Homeland Security color-coded terrorist threat warnings daily, in
the corner of the screen, beginning six months after 9/11.182 In 2005, USA Today ran a story that
cited the former head of DHS, Tom Ridge, "periodically" escalated the terror warning based
upon "only flimsy evidence" or Fox News purposefully chose to bolster ratings and incite fear.
Not all the reporting by the mainstream media focused on terrorist threats from al Qaeda or Iraq.
For example, the Washington Post argued the benefits of inculcating democracy and
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revolutionizing human rights in Iraq. 183 However, this was not the main argument of the
administration or the mainstream media that consistently supported the administration. While
many news agencies endorsed the president's agenda regarding Iraq, when the papers ran pieces
challenging the president's rhetoric, they were placed in the paper's back pages. The former
editor of the Washington Post, Howard Kurtz, found the newspaper ran roughly 140 front-page
articles supporting the Bush administration's call to war in Iraq between August 2002 and March
2003, and only a handful of stories against the war that opposed the invasion of Iraq or
challenged intelligence claims. 184
The role of the twenty-four-seven cable news networks in reporting the terrorists
responsible for 9/11 created an opportunity for media professionals to do deep-level analysis of
persons like Osama bin Laden. The nascent social media across the globe also played a role in
spreading information about the new era of the terrorist threat to the U.S. Political Science
Professor Brigitte Nacos declares that, because the public relied on the news for information,
even more so television reporting, the administration provided reports that reinforced the
president's rhetoric for dissemination. Nacos also argued that the mainstream media had a habit
of turning recent terrorists like bin Laden into a kind of outlaw celebrity. The logic behind this is
that the media consistently portrays the enemy as the embodiment of evil in the aftermath of the
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attacks that shook the U.S. The continuous coverage of the terrorist attacks benefited al Qaeda by
the consistent publicity and propaganda for the recruitment of like-minded Muslim extremists.185
After al Qaeda was repeatedly hit by five years of unmanned aerial vehicle bombs on top
of twelve years of fighting following 9/11, the organization was still successful in recruitment.
Al Qaeda’s propaganda efforts resulted in hundreds to thousands of persons radicalized and
willing to carry out terrorist attacks.186 In a New York Times opinion article dated 15 July 2006,
the author explained how al Qaeda leaders were attempting to recruit non-radicalized U.S.
citizens based upon the public relations nightmares created by U.S. forces by means of rape,
harming of innocent Muslims, and incidents at detention centers. The author of the article
believes that this new method of recruitment could be quite effective. I concur with the author’s
conclusion in stating that it was dangerous for the U.S. to remain in Iraq and possibly encourage
additional new followers of radicalized groups like al Qaeda. 187
During this period, the growth of social media allowed for the sharing of coverage of
terrorist attacks and added another channel to the spread of the president's rhetoric. However,
there is a dark side to social media in this story. Once videos of ISIS beheadings of the Western
infidels appeared on social media platforms in 2013-2014, the companies removed them. Still,
the mainstream media reported the alarming acts depicted in these videos with great detail. The
news organizations further reinforced the depiction of these extremists as evil in opposition to
the innocent blood that they shed. In a shocking change in acceptable policy in depicting terrorist
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acts like these beheadings, the Fox News network posted an unedited video of the execution in
2015 of a Jordanian pilot by ISIS. Although it is easy to assume that only those who already
were in opposition to the U.S. would join al Qaeda to act in the U.S., the campaign to target
vulnerable persons who were disturbed by the human rights violations of innocent Iraqis, those
who would not have considered themselves extremists, were susceptible to recruitment
propaganda. When news agencies like Fox released tapes, the terrorists achieved their aims to
capture the attention of the U.S. citizenry and the global populace now that they were aware that
the U.S. mainland was not invulnerable to attack. 188
While the Bush administration fought to utilize the mass media to build support for their
mission in Iraq, the terrorist Osama bin Laden strategically used the media to gain followers and
achieve a greater status. In this way, the media was critical in promoting the enemy of the state,
al Qaeda, and the enemy posed by the Islamic extremists, such as ISIS. The press continued to be
used as a tool for manipulation in the days immediately preceding the 2004 presidential election.
The traditional bin Laden outfit, camouflaged military drab with a weapon in hand, was
eschewed in favor of a soft robe and a calm demeanor displayed on the videotape. Although the
full tape was not able to be tracked-down, typical of many of bin Laden’s twenty-nine known
videos, many of the videos that were partially broadcast and agencies such as ABC published an
English language transcript. 189
The transcript of the 2004 video in question has bin Laden discussing how U.S. citizens
have abandoned their freedom for a feeling of security. Bin Laden claimed that al Qaeda does
not hate freedom but was trying to secure freedom by any means necessary, as he blessed the
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memory of the 9/11 hijackers. Bin Laden attacked President George W. Bush’s practice of
distortion and misleading of the U.S. citizenry and claimed that the dictatorship of President
George W. Bush had continued with the passage of the Patriot Act in the name of fighting terror.
Bin Laden posed another political argument when he claimed that election rigging occurred in
Florida in the 2000 election and claimed that Bush could not lead the nation when the towers fell
but chose to talk to children about a story in their classroom after being informed of the 9/11
attacks. bin Laden concluded this tape by claiming that U.S. citizens need to secure freedom for
themselves and not rely on political leaders, be them Democrat or Republican. 190
This deliberate change in the attire that bin Laden wore and the manner in which he
spoke prompted intelligence experts to conclude that the tape aimed to depict bin Laden as a
statesman of status generally reserved for leaders of nations like the United States. This press
release by bin Laden received considerable mass media attention, but the leading presidential
candidates refused to discuss the terrorist leader's message.191 Although the Bush administration
received considerable support from the media, they did not want to share the spotlight with bin
Laden across the media spectrum. When President George W. Bush responded to the airing of
the bin Laden video, he was departing Toledo, Ohio on 29 October 2004 at just before 6 p.m.
local time. Bush stated that the United States would not be intimidated or influenced by an
enemy of the U.S and reminded U.S. citizens that they are at war with terrorism in a struggle
which the United States would prevail. The Bush administration’s calm, yet dismissive, response
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to the bin Laden videotape was likely done to remove bin Laden from the political conversation
in the United States with a presidential election only days away.192
While the Bush administration was dealing with a war in Afghanistan, the frustration at
having failed to capture Osama bin Laden who continued to taunt the U.S. by video, and a
relatively close presidential reelection campaign, the mainstream media remained a useful tool.
The Bush administration benefitted greatly from the repetition of the threat that Iraq posed in
speeches, interviews with the press, and the papers' journalism on the subject of President
Hussein, WMDs, and 9/11. The opportunity of the Bush administration to control much of the
narrative built support for the invasion among the average U.S. citizens. Three polls, with a total
of 3,334 respondents, were conducted between August and September 2003 that revealed three
beliefs that were false but continued to be accepted by a considerable portion of the U.S.
populace. The first false belief was that there was irrefutable proof that President Hussein was
currently cooperating with the terror network al Qaeda. The second false belief was that WMDs
had already been discovered in Iraq before the invasion on 19 March 2003. The third false belief
was that many nations of the world were supportive of a U.S. invasion of Iraq. Such a striking
number of respondents with false perceptions prompted scholars to investigate these individuals'
sources for news information.
Of the 3,334 respondents, only nineteen per cent stated that print media was their source
for news, while eighty per cent stated that they received their news electronically. Of those
respondents who held all three of these significant misperceptions about Iraq, the per cent of
those who received their information from Fox News was greater than those who received their
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news from all other major U.S. carriers of news. The same trend was demonstrated for persons
who held one or two of these misperceptions. They obtained most of their news from Fox
News.193 The fact that Fox News viewers and consumers of its digital content held these
significant misperceptions at a greater rate than consumers of other media outlets strongly
suggests that there was no challenge to the talking points of the administration in their reporting.
The constant threat of terrorism was a main talking point of Fox News at the time.
Professor of Government William A. Dorman argued that the media failed to truly
challenge the Bush administration on its evidence against Iraq and its case for an invasion of the
nation. Dorman stated that in a review of history in the modern era, there has never been such a
rapid collection of evidence supporting the war, and the assumptions of the intelligence have
never been so questionable. As has been stated repeatedly, the failure to discover WMDs in Iraq
after the invasion was a black eye for President George W. Bush and his administration. The
missing WMDs were not the only intelligence failure of the war. However, the multiple reasons
for the invasion of Iraq proved faulty and led many to question if the administration purposefully
manipulated information or propagated claims known to be false. The mainstream media's role in
the invasion is essential because, as it did little to challenge the administration, the Fourth Estate
did not provide reliable information to the citizenry. The result was that the citizens of the U.S.
did not give informed consent for the invasion. Instead, the media framed the support for the war
as “common sense” and led its consumers to make ill-informed decisions about whether to go to
war against Iraq or if other threats to the U.S. were more significant at the time. 194
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The survey findings discussed by Political Psychologist Steven Kull et al. illustrated that
the press contributed to shaping the argument for the invasion of Iraq by failing to challenge the
declarations of the Bush administration and other hawks in Congress, as mentioned at the
beginning of this chapter. For those that argue that the president never encouraged false beliefs
about Iraq, Dorman argued that a content analysis of each presidential speech on the subject of
terrorism and Iraq from 11 September 2001 to 1 May 2003 showed the public responded
positively to presidential rhetoric. The results from this analysis were that, while some debate
continued on the policy for the invasion of Iraq within the president’s inner circle, very little
occurred in the pages of the New York Times. Because the media framed the invasion in support
of the government's stance, support for President George W. Bush was never lower than fiftyfive per cent and climbed higher than seventy per cent, despite the public's awareness that the
invasion could result in a significant number of casualties, a damaged economy, and the
possibility that terrorist acts could increase on U.S. soil.195
Like many others, when the argument of the need to invade Iraq was repeated by
President George W. Bush and his staff at the time, I was not convinced personally. However,
when former U.S. Army General Colin Powell, then the Secretary of State, argued that Iraq
could not go unchecked, I believed in Colin Powell and trusted him as an established leader. I
was not alone in that feeling. For instance, there is an opinion piece published after Colin
Powell’s death on 19 October 2021 that concurs that the United States trusted Colin Powell more
than many others in the Bush administration and his speech before the U.N. converted many
opposed to the invasion into supporters.196 According to scholars such as Communications
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Professor Alexander Nikolaev and Communications Professor Ernest Hakanen, Secretary of
State Colin Powell's speech to the U.N. on 5 February 2003 bolstered the case for the invasion of
Iraq in the media. Powell made explicit ties between Iraq and al Qaeda in this speech, and there
was a 30-point increase in the public's confidence that President Hussein posed a severe threat.
After the speech, several editorialists across the U.S. declared the evidence as indisputable, and
Hussein was concealing a threat to the U.S. Although some journalists questioned or challenged
assertions in Powell's U.N. speech, they were typically opinion or editorial pieces instead of
journalistic articles. The number of these pieces was still small. 197 With little challenge posed by
the mainstream media, the Bush administration was able to buttress their argument of the
supposed threat that Iraq posed and deliver multiple reasons why pre-emptive military action in
Iraq was warranted.

The Journalists Who Challenged the Bush Narrative
As much as the mainstream media did little to challenge the narrative of the Bush
administration and its rhetoric in supporting the invasion of Iraq, it is important to pay attention
to those who continually opposed the majority view. Because of the framing that journalists
provide to the citizens to understand their political circumstances, news reporting is rarely more
important than when a nation is considering military action. According to the study conducted by
Communication and Women’s Studies Professor Dustin Harp et al., Time allowed for voices of
dissension against the Bush administration from the beginning. This point is vital because Time
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had a circulation of 3.3 million and is the widest-read news publication in the nation. 198
However, Time was not alone in its challenging of the administration. The newspaper reporting
agency, also known as a wire service, Knight Ridder was persistent in trying to report the truth
on the invasion to the best of their abilities, even when it was a dissenting voice to the
mainstream narrative. One of Knight Ridder’s stalwart reporters was Jonathan S. Landay.
Landay’s articles that pushed for further clarification on the argument for invading Iraq were
published in papers such as the Chicago Tribune, the Star Tribune, The Washington Post, the
Toronto Star, and twenty-seven others. The Knight Ridder agency provided wire service to
approximately 350 newspapers.199
Landay’s article from 12 September 2002, titled "Iraq has been unable to get materials for
a nuclear bomb, experts say," stated that although President George W. Bush claimed the
previous day that Iraq was equipped to produce WMDs within a year, President Hussein has
been unable to acquire that fuel for more than ten years. The article also disputed the notion that
Iraq could obtain enriched uranium or plutonium on the black market due to the number of
safeguards in place to prevent that from happening. Furthermore, the article stated that the IAEA
had destroyed all of Iraq's nuclear weapons facilities in 1998. Therefore, instead of supporting an
invasion of Iraq, Landay argued that it is more important to resume weapons inspections. 200
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Approximately one month later, on 4 October 2002, Landay wrote another article
challenging the claims of the Bush administration that the threat of Iraqi weapons, and in
particular its nuclear threat, was universally supported by intelligence experts. A central
argument from the Bush administration was that the only purpose of the high-strength aluminum
tubes Hussein allegedly obtained from foreign nations was to create enriched uranium. 201
However, these claims were disputed by some intelligence agencies and even a former U.N.
weapons inspector that claimed that it was more likely that the tubes were intended to be used in
conventional weapons systems. The article cited anonymous intelligence and administration
officials that stated that the administration was tailoring intelligence to fit its argument that Iraq
must be invaded, and the regime of President Hussein overthrown. In this same article, Landay
notes that some intelligence and military leaders were not convinced that Iraq's supposed ties to
WMDs presented an imminent threat to the U.S. that warranted a pre-emptive attack. The article
closed with one scientist noting that the administration expected to make any claims that it
desired and not have the facts to back those claims. At the same time, the Bush White House
demanded complacency from the scientific community.202 This is similar to how the Bush
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administration cherry picked intelligence from the CIA’s 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on
Iraq to support their call for an invasion of Iraq while ignoring the alternative views published in
the report that depicted Iraq as a nation incapable of presenting a viable nuclear threat to the U.S.
One of the many articles written by the Knight Ridder Newspapers agency on the
questionable intelligence surrounding the Iraqi invasion of 2003 discussed a leaked British
intelligence report. Although the article was released on 5 May 2005, the report was so scathing
that it embarrassed British and U.S. officials. 203 The Secret Downing Street Memo of 23 July
2002 was a confidential document that summarized a meeting between named and code-named
officials. The document declared that because President George W. Bush desired to remove
Hussein from power through military force and the intelligence and facts were "fixed around the
policy." 204 The memo continued that there were no serious plans by the National Security
Council, led by Condoleezza Rice, to utilize the U.N. to achieve the president's goals. No plans
had been discussed on what to do in Iraq after President Hussein was removed. At this same
meeting in 2002, military planners were drafting the military movement options for the invasion.
The intelligence in the memo acknowledged that Iraq posed a WMD threat lesser than Libya,
North Korea, or Iran.205
In the Warren Strobel and John Walcott article on the secret memorandum, the authors
reminded readers that the Bush administration has vehemently denied that there had been any
manipulation of intelligence in the development of the public case against Iraq. The article
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concluded with a remark that the leading Democrat of the House Judiciary Committee, John
Conyers, pushed the Bush administration to explain the assertions in this concerning memo. 206 It
is interesting that a member of the minority party in the House, which had a considerable number
of members that opposed the congressional resolution for war, spoke out in favor of the Bush
administration. The first troubling part about this memo is that it shows that by mid-2002, the
Bush administration was already committed to using military force in Iraq before the avenues of
diplomacy had closed. The second concerning issue of the memo is the statement that by this
point, President George W. Bush and his team were fixing intelligence to support the need for
ousting President Hussein.
Years after the invasion of Iraq, the team from Knight Ridder Newspapers and
McClatchy are remembered for taking a stance against the complacent majority of the
mainstream media that did little more than repeat the talking points of the Bush administration.
The Knight Ridder team was an outlier of the mainstream media in the period leading up to and
including the invasion and the years following. Journalists from Knight Ridder wrote exposing
pieces on the talking points the Bush administration used to legitimize the invasion. 207 The
Knight Ridder reporters did concede that they had access to information from sources, including
mid-level and senior-level officials that questioned the intelligence that the Bush administration
used, that wouldn't speak with other agencies, though Landay did not disclose who these people
were.208 The Knight Ridder team used these sources to look behind the veil and discover
alternative views on the intelligence that the Bush team presented as evidence. Because the
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Knight Ridder agency was relatively small at the time, the journalists fought a massive
misinformation campaign unknowingly and uncritically carried out by most media outlets. An
interesting tactic that Knight Ridder employed in covering the mission in Iraq was that the
agency challenged every allegation or claim made by the Bush administration and spoke out
when the intelligence did not match the claims of these officials. This type of journalism was not
easy but prompted respect for the journalistic integrity of the agency after other news agencies
discovered the flaws in their earlier reporting on the subject of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 209
The media is also a tool used by the U.S. State Department.
The role of the mainstream media in the U.S. painted a picture of implicit support, for the
most part, of the Bush administration and plans for Iraq. Additionally, the U.S. State Department
and its agents influenced the media in other nations and monitored media reports from multiple
nations as part of its roadmap to Iraq. The U.S. State Department also paid attention to the pulse
of the citizens in other nations regarding its plans for Iraq. For example, on 16 September 2002,
the State Department cabled the U.S. Secretary of State that polls taken on 14 and 15 September
2002 showed that Australian citizens strongly supported, by sixty-eight per cent, a U.N.-backed
military invasion of Iraq. The poll also indicated that sixty-seven per cent opposed unilateral
action by the United States. The cable continued that although the Australian media remained
critical of unilateral U.S. action, they begrudgingly approved of the speech that President George
W. Bush gave to the U.N. The cable contains multiple references to news reports and a debate on
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local media on the issues surrounding Iraq and the influence of the U.S. president's speech to the
U.N.210
I was able to collect ten U.S. State Department cables released under the Freedom of
Information Act related to the issue of shaping foreign policy regarding Iraq. I have used these
selected cables to illustrate the different manners that the State Department used regarding
monitoring or influencing foreign policy for the U.S. through government channels and
interviews with local media outlets. By reviewing these cables, I noticed how U.S. Ambassadors
and other State Department officials repeated the rhetoric of President George W. Bush in
various countries globally to bolster support for what appears to be the foregone conclusion that
military force in Iraq was the only option the administration was considering by late 2002.
In certain nations, the U.S. State Department utilized its embassy staff members to
educate and influence its citizens regarding the official stance on Iraq and why they should
support such efforts. One example that summarized these efforts is a U.S. Embassy cable from
Kyiv, Ukraine, to the U.S. Secretary of State in Washington, D.C. At the beginning of the cable,
the U.S. Embassy explains that the situation in Iraq on 20 September 2002 was viewed through
Ukraine's domestic political challenges. Therefore, the U.S. Embassy stated that it was the
responsibility of the State Department to educate the citizens of Ukraine about the facts, as
propagated by the Bush administration and explain the threat that Iraq posed to global
security.211
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Notably, the second page of the cable stated that the more that the U.S. Embassy and the
State Department as a whole educated the Ukrainian citizens, the better odds they had at
preventing purposeful, negative changes to the perspective of the official U.S. government's
position. However, the cable warned that there was a general opposition towards military action
by the Ukrainian populace. Also, the nation of Ukraine conducted trade and business with Iraq as
part of the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food Program that would likely be disturbed by military action and
regime change. Finally, the cable concluded that in every media interview conducted with the
U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, the interviewer raised the issue of military action in Iraq. The
questions were typically regarding the questionable threat posed by President Hussein, the lack
of universal support by long-standing U.S. allies, and the failure to secure a U.N. Security
Council Resolution authorizing military force in Iraq. The cable noted that the best tool to secure
the road to action in Iraq is the U.S. Ambassadors that can make a case for invasion with the
media.212
A second cable examined here is between the U.S. Embassy in Rome and the U.S.
Secretary of State on 13 September 2002. This cable reported that the government of Italy, a
NATO ally, was moving more in line with the official U.S. position on Iraq. Although the Italian
government preferred that war be avoided, Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi was priming the
citizenry for the possibility of military action in Baghdad through strategic public outreach. The
Italian government stepped-up their public relations strategies to continue to develop support for
military action in Iraq. The cable discussed Italian President Carlo A. Ciampi’s position,
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delivered at a 9/11 anniversary ceremony in Italy, that it is not enough to simply fight terror but
that it must be eradicated from the public’s mind and remove WMDs from rogue nations. The
cable mentioned that the nation of Italy will be a useful ally when President George W. Bush
visited the state in roughly two months from the date of the cable. The cable stated that a
telephone call between the U.S. Ambassador to Italy, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and Italian
President Ciampi in the days leading to the first anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks
reinforced U.S. talking points that terrorism must be eradicated from extremists' hearts and
minds. The cable concluded that the State Department should continue to pursue the aims of a
classified and redacted reference telegram, as has been done in Italy.213

Journalism from the Front Lines: Vietnam and Iraq
Although decades passed between the Vietnam War and the invasion of Iraq on 19 March
2003, very little changed in how the U.S. government controlled the media reporting of
journalists serving in country in each conflict. After the Vietnam War, many veterans and U.S.
citizens believed that the press was responsible for the American defeat by depicting casualties,
lost battles, and the war crimes of My Lai. Some media critics argued that the media in Vietnam
purposefully spread a left-wing, antiwar position in its reporting. 214 This was not the reality of
journalism in Vietnam as the U.S. controlled the stories and talking points that the press was fed
by the U.S. Information Bureau. The journalists were a tool of the U.S. Executive Branch in
Vietnam as they would be some forty years later in Iraq.
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In the case of the Vietnam War, most journalists were stationed at military bases incountry (typically Saigon), with a handful temporarily attached as accredited journalists
reporting from the front lines.215 Journalist and former editor of The Atlantic, Cullen Murphy
argued that journalists and U.S. service members in Vietnam had different roles and distinct
cultures, which typically made them suspicious of one another. Furthermore, the U.S.
government did not trust either the media or the military, and the distrust was mutual by these
parties.216 When the Battle of Ap Bac occurred in 1963, journalists were based in Saigon, and the
distance between the military event impacted the reporting negatively by limiting what was
disclosed about the event. The White House and the military expected that the journalists in
Vietnam focus on the positive aspects of the battle and stick with the team. 217
At that time, newsreels from Vietnam would take at least a day before it was received and
broadcast on network news. Reporters were impacted by the fact that they had to chase down the
stories, because of the sparse information they were given by the military’s public affairs officers
in charge of the journalists, and rarely had a chance to conduct investigative reporting. Korean
War veteran and The Post’s Saigon Bureau Chief, Peter Braestrup, noted that journalists could
never know the whole story of a conflict in Vietnam as the war was ever-evolving.218 In fact, it is
impossible for journalists to report on the whole story of a war that they are covering due to the
countless variables and actors at play in war at any given time. However, I use the Vietnam War
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as a point of comparison with Iraq because in both war zones the media became an agent to be
controlled. Although information for reporting in other conflicts that the U.S. was involved in,
such as World War II, Vietnam represented a period where a considerable number of journalists
were working in country during the conflict. The White House and the U.S. Information Agency
regularly moved journalists away from stories that could be reported upon and cast the U.S. in a
negative light.219 This is not the case with the Iraq War of 2003 where most journalists incountry were attached to military units and reported on what they saw or heard daily. The subject
of attached or embedded reporters is important because I will show that the opportunity to serve
as an embedded journalist was not as useful for news agencies as it was for the Bush
administration in controlling the narrative in the field and at home.
To illustrate the contrast between the Vietnam War with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 I
highlight that certain events, such as the Battle of Ap Bac in December 1963, happened quickly.
In contrast, there was over one year of buildup to the military offensive in Iraq on 19 March
2003. The diplomatic process of building support for the actions in Iraq both within the United
States and abroad was slow. Still, it seemed more and more likely during 2002 that the U.S.
would attack Iraq and oust President Hussein based upon the threat of WMDs than exhaust all
diplomatic options, such as permitting the U.N. weapons inspectors to have additional time to
verify Iraqi arms. One similarity between the Vietnam War and the invasion of Iraq was that the

219

Karnow, Vietnam: A History, p. 312. Note: During WWII, roughly 1,800 Allied
correspondents reported on the events they witnessed, though everything was filtered by the
military. For further reading on WWII Correspondents see Ray Moseley, Reporting War: How
Foreign Correspondents Risked Capture, Torture and Death to Cover World War II (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018). There were 501 U.S. war correspondents in Vietnam.
For further information on Vietnam War Correspondents, see William M. Hammond, “Who
Were the Saigon Correspondents and Does It Matter?,” Shorenstein Center (Harvard, November
19, 2015), https://shorensteincenter.org/who-were-the-saigon-correspondents-and-does-itmatter/.
105

Bush administration never backed down on their version of the facts of the case for war.
However, the press corps had grown and become splintered since the Vietnam War. Also, the
news moved at lightning speed compared to the journalistic process of the Vietnam era. Gone
were the days when newsreels were loaded onto planes to be broadcast in the United States from
offices in Tokyo. Instead, the news was broadcast live from Iraq. Print journalism could be
uploaded within minutes. The cable news networks operated twenty-four hours a day, seven days
a week, and served viewers globally. 220
The downside to this rapid-fire journalism was that as the war in Iraq continued for years,
the consensus of U.S. citizens was that the media took too long to scrutinize the Bush
administration's rhetoric because the press’ goal was rapid reporting and breaking news instead
of deliberate investigation and had given credence to the Bush administration’s claims about
Iraq.221 The most damning evidence of the failure of the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq
was that those tasked with tracking down the WMDs continued to come up empty-handed.
According to Iraq Security Group’s David Kay testimony before Congress on 28 January 2004,
no WMDs were found, which began to switch how the legitimacy of the war was reported on. 222
The factors that influenced journalism in the Vietnam War, such as "ignorance, confusion,
inexperience, deadlines, excitement, competition," and the reliance on questionable sources,
continued to be present in Iraq. 223 As the war dragged on in Iraq, the coverage by embedded
journalists continued but to a lesser degree. Pew polling revealed that the amount of reporting on
Iraq that made it into the mainstream media declined considerably as the occupation of Iraq
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continued for years.224 This was not because the journalism was questionable but because the
U.S. populace had lost its attention span regarding the War on Terror. Less screen time on cable
news and smaller print areas in newspapers were given to covering the slough.
Professor Greg McLaughlin is a specialist in media and journalism who argued that the
benefit of embedded reporting, though presented as a manner to provide the best in-depth
coverage of the war, was not in providing the truth about the war. Those who benefitted the
most, in fact, were the members of the Bush administration. The Bush administration’s manner
of handling the media by embedding them with specific military units and the biased media
briefings that had the administration’s desired spin on stories and information restricted the
journalists’ working parameters. This spin on the news supported President George W. Bush and
would later become reasons for professional derision because the majority of journalists rarely
challenged the story given them.225
The embedded journalists in Iraq attended daily briefings, typically conducted by highranking officers or political agents, to obtain more information to report. Still, there were explicit
rules that applied to the journalists. In these briefings, "questions were rationed out, follow-ups
were discouraged, and the briefers rarely provided full answers to questions." 226 When journalist
Michael Wolff challenged the quality of the information disseminated in 2003, he was quickly
told that he could not ask further questions. The working conditions at these briefings were so
hostile that many journalists questioned their reason for working as embedded journalists. The
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embedded journalists were not naïve about their reasons for being there as agents of the Bush
administration. However, it is unlikely that they would assume that they would be used in the
same manner that the journalists covering Vietnam from Saigon had been four decades earlier.
McLaughlin argued that the system of embedded journalists was essential to the Bush
administration not just because their information could be controlled but also because journalists
readily conform to situations, live with restrictions placed upon them, and hesitate to ask
unauthorized questions while they were surrounded by the restrictive situations of military life
during combat operations.227
Although the role of the media during the planning and execution of the invasion of Iraq
was more an agent of President George W. Bush's administration than an examiner of its
rhetoric, it is important to recognize its successes and failures. The newspaper agency Knight
Ridder demonstrated that not every media source acquiesced or simply repeated the U.S.
government's talking points. In the legacy of journalism and the Iraq War, the agencies that
challenged the administration are remembered as fighters, seeking to frame the intelligence
properly. Although embedded journalism would appear to provide a closer look at the war as it
unfolded, research shows that the government heavily filtered their reporting. The role that the
U.S. State Department played in selling the invasion of Iraq to foreign states and laying the
groundwork for developing a Coalition of the Willing was more extensive than what many news
audiences would likely have considered.
The third chapter examines how President George W. Bush cobbled together a Coalition
of the Willing and investigates the reasons behind Germany and France's official opposition to
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the pre-emptive war in Iraq. This chapter examines the coalition's role in unifying the United
States and some of its allies and identifying what other longtime allies chose to rebuke
militarization of the Iraq-U.S. conflict. Although the mission in Iraq was different than
Afghanistan, the problem of getting allies to commit troops or funds seemed to stem more from
the questionable intelligence and the fact that a pre-emptive war conflicted with the U.N. Charter
and international laws that many countries supported. The reasons for these nations to stand with
or against the United States, and the effect that it had on U.S. foreign policy and the Bush
administration, is examined in the following chapter.
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Chapter Three: Building a Coalition of the Willing
Although many scholars consider the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to be a unilateral military
mission on the part of the U.S., there was a considerable effort in the Bush administration to
build a “Coalition of the Willing.” Despite President George W. Bush’s assertion that the U.S.
would act alone if necessary, regarding Iraq, from a public relations standpoint, it was easier to
legitimize the invasion of Iraq if the Bush administration could demonstrate the support of
partner nations. This coalition of partner nations would operate under the command of the U.S.
military with the primary goal of ousting President Saddam Hussein. To gain the support of
partner nations, President George W. Bush engaged diplomatically with various longstanding
U.S. allies. The most vital partnership developed by the Bush administration was with Great
Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair. However, the Bush administration was not universally
successful in bringing all its ally nations on board. Two particular nations, France and Germany,
were strong allies of the United States for decades and assisted in the war in Afghanistan but
were not willing to support an invasion of Iraq. The separation of these allies from Operation
Iraqi Freedom in 2003 is notable and will be reviewed in this chapter. Before detailing the
formation of the coalition, I answer a common question of why the U.S. did not simply
assassinate Hussein. Following that explanation, I identify the steps the Bush administration took
in developing commitments from its allied nations. I conclude the chapter with the motivations
France and Germany had in staying away from the Coalition of the Willing.
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Why Not Simply Assassinate Hussein?
With the complications involved in invading Iraq, such as building a coalition of partner
nations and the risk of U.S. and allied service members’ lives, scholars such as former CIA
intelligence analyst and Middle East policy expert Kenneth Pollack posed the question of why
the United States did not simply assassinate President Hussein. Pollack argued that an
assassination or a palace coup of Hussein would possibly make Iraq a more tolerable nation in
the eyes of the U.S., and the leader to replace Hussein would likely try to establish a more
acceptable relationship with western powers. Pollack also stated that the legal hurdles posed by
an assassination are not as challenging to overcome as there is no law preventing assassinations
of foreign officials but merely a U.S. executive order. Executive order 11905 (1976) resulted
from the Church Committee revelations that the CIA had been involved in numerous
assassination attempts after World War II, all initiated by the Executive Branch. President Gerald
Ford implemented Executive Order 11905, prohibiting assassinations by U.S. government
agents. The order has been carried over to each subsequent presidential administration. However,
Pollack stated, executive orders can be altered or rescinded by a subsequent executive order,
which is not a complicated process. Furthermore, the executive order prohibiting assassinations
of foreign leaders has been ignored in the past. Post-1976 examples of U.S. attempts to kill
foreign leaders include Muammar Qadhafi in 1986, Mohammed Farah Aidid in 1993, Osama bin
Laden in 1998, and even a plan to kill Hussein during the Gulf War of 1990-1991.228 These
examples indicate that although there was an executive order in place prohibiting assassinations,
the sitting president could, and did, authorize assassination attempts on multiple enemies of the
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United States.229 Interestingly, the U.S. government argued that these attacks were not
assassination attempts prohibited by the executive order because they were acts of self-defense
against threats to the United States. Under this logic, a pre-emptive assassination of Hussein
could seem to be legal in the eyes of U.S. leaders.
Pollack noted that there is also no international law prohibiting assassinations. The U.N.
Charter states that political agents or individuals are granted immunity from violence by persons
and military members of another state during peacetime. But, in war, international law permits
the targeted executions of enemy state leaders or members of its chain of command. However,
Pollack stated that not all wars are officially declared in the modern era, making the international
law in question here outdated. The United States could have argued that because Iraq was not in
adherence to the U.N. Security Council Resolutions after the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the
assassination may have been legal by those guidelines.
This begs the question of why the U.S. didn’t simply assassinate Hussein instead of
launching a costly war in 2003. The short answer is that it would have been complicated to reach
Hussein in Iraq by covert means because of his extensive military force and close network of
those in his immediate circle, the Murafiqin, that would likely prevent an assassination attempt.
President John F. Kennedy’s 1963 Bay of Pigs fiasco serves as a cautionary example of failed
attempts to assassinate a foreign leader. Despite careful planning of the overthrow of Fidel
Castro in Cuba, the result was a political disaster for the Kennedy administration and the CIA.
Although an assassination attempt of Hussein may have been possible, it would have been
extremely difficult for a foreign agency to succeed. 230
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Another reason that the U.S. may have refrained from an assassination attempt on
Hussein is that, if the only fatality from the mission was President Hussein, it is likely that one of
Hussein’s two sons, Uday or Qusay, would have seized power and the remaining network of
security and military forces in Iraq would remain untouched. Moreover, President Hussein’s sons
were known to be as ruthless and cunning as their father. Removing Saddam and instituting a
brief power vacuum for one of his sons to lead the nation could result in Iraq continuing to
threaten the United States. Finally, by launching a mission to assassinate Hussein, the U.S. might
have established a precedent unfavorable to its own interests in the future. 231 A closing note on
the benefits of assassinations comes from historian Franklin L. Ford. Ford, who observed that
“the history of countless assassinations, examined to compare apparent motives with actual
outcomes, contains almost none that produced results consonant with the aims of the doer,
assuming those aims to have extended at all beyond the miserable taking of a life.” 232 Thus, even
assuming that a group could assassinate President Hussein, there is no guarantee that the desired
outcomes in Iraq would have occurred, other than likely removing one dictator to create space
for the installation of another, possibly more ruthless, leader. For these reasons and the others
presented, there was not a solid plan created to assassinate Hussein in the period following 9/11.
Or, if there was such a plan, it is possible that it is still classified.
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Identifying the Willing Allies and Fostering Partnership
Although the development of a coalition of partner nations to join in the war against al
Qaeda and the Taliban within Afghanistan did not require a great deal of time, I argue that
building that same coalition for invading Iraq proved much more difficult. Building a coalition of
partner nations for the war in Afghanistan, dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom, in response to
the 9/11 attacks was executed quickly by Secretary of State Colin Powell. Great Britain and
Australia committed forces to deploy alongside U.S. service members. Japan and South Korea
offered humanitarian assistance and logistical support (and later, they sent troops). Also, Arab
nation partners like Jordan and Saudi Arabia passed along valuable intelligence relating to the
activity of the al Qaeda network of terrorists. President George W. Bush declared that the
essential partner in the war in Afghanistan was the nation of Pakistan. The president stated in his
autobiography that no other country wielded as much power over Afghanistan as Pakistan.
Although in the past, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates had acknowledged
the Taliban as the legitimate leadership within Afghanistan, Pakistan had made that move
strategically to prevent India from growing more influential and threatening to Pakistan itself.
Pakistan was not a traditional ally of the U.S. The state had operated a secret nuclear weapons
program and the U.S. had ceased cooperation with the nation and ended Congressional aid in
2001.233
The focus of this section is the gathering of support from partner nations. The discussion
of what motivated those allied nations to oppose the Coalition of the Willing is discussed later. A
good deal of attention is paid to identifying the reasons that other allied nations chose to distance
themselves from military action in Iraq. Most of the international community indeed desired for
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President Hussein to be disarmed. However, the execution of a military operation and the use of
force to oust the president were not widely supported.234 Bush’s strongest ally on the issue of
Iraq was Prime Minister Tony Blair. On the night of the 9/11 attacks, Prime Minister Blair
delivered a statement from his Downing Street residence on the threat of terrorism. The fight
against terror would not be fought alone by the U.S. Britain would stand “shoulder to shoulder
with our American friends.”235 Blair stated in his autobiography that the attacks were an atrocity
and an attack on the U.S., the leader of the free world, was also an attack on Britain. PM Blair
also identified the importance of Britain’s contribution to shaping the war, which required that
Britain be a part of the Bush administration’s coalition from the beginning. Furthermore, many
British lost their lives in the 9/11 attacks, which made terrorism a key point of national interest
and must be eradicated. Blair believed that support of the U.S. must be unequivocal, and the
U.K. would ally with the United States fully. 236
Both Prime Minister Blair and President George W. Bush agreed that, despite
reservations by the U.S. in involving the U.N. in obtaining authorization for war in Iraq, the pair
would not be restrained from acting if the international community did not support the War on
Terror. Blair and Bush agreed that pursuing U.N. support for the Iraq invasion might be easier if
there was a coalition of partner nations supporting the United States. Blair expressed concern
about the U.S. acting unilaterally in Iraq, even if the U.K. supported the matter, and promoted
building a coalition of partner nations as a smart move. Bush and Blair were able to build support
for the upcoming military action in Iraq from a network of thirteen of the twenty-five countries
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of the European Union and an overall total of over thirty nations worldwide. Notably, very few
of these willing countries would send troops. Instead, they agreed to provide financial support,
intelligence support, and physical locations where U.S. troops and their equipment were to be
staged before moving on into Iraq. 237 The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia
committed troops to Iraq. Some of the major players providing other forms of support were
Spain, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the entirety of the Eastern European
countries. In a NATO vote on the issue of Iraq, fifteen of the thirty member states were in favor
of military action. At the same time, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, and France stood against
military action by the United States.238 Although the Coalition of the Willing was somewhat
broad, Israel was never officially named as one of those partner nations. 239 The U.S. was
purposefully careful not to broaden its War on Terror during the period that it sought to increase
the number of partner countries in the Coalition of the Willing.
The U.S. chose not to launch a military strike against Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a terrorist
linked to al Qaeda who had experience with chemical and biological warfare, though he was
purportedly experimenting with poisons and toxins in a lab in northeastern Iraq in the summer of
2002. al-Zarqawi had been connected to attacks on both U.S. and Israeli interests. The current
intelligence suggested that he may be planning to bring chemical materials from his lab in Iraq
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into the U.S. However, intelligence could not state with high confidence that President Hussein
knew that this al Qaeda terrorist was operating within Iraq. The CIA requested that President
Hussein extradite al-Zarqawi to the United States, but Hussein refused and claimed that he could
not be found. Although there was a high-ranking terrorist that may have been operating within
Iraq, the decision to bomb or not to bomb the laboratory in Iraq in 2002 was not agreed upon by
key members of the Bush administration. Specifically, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice were
against such action. These two key officials worried that military action against a lab in Iraq
could make building the coalition of partner countries standing behind the U.S. more difficult. In
particular, the U.S. had concerns regarding how an attack on these labs might influence Turkey,
a prospective member of the Coalition of the Willing. The Bush administration worried that an
attack on the mobile weapons labs could be construed as the first unilateral strike against Iraq.
Ultimately, President George W. Bush took a diplomatic stance on this issue and told the
intelligence community to keep abreast of the al-Zarqawi problem.240 This was one of several
times when the Bush administration pursued diplomatic action before launching the invasion of
Iraq.
Even as late as 24 February 2003, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony
Blair continued to pursue a U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq.
At the U.N. meeting that day, the U.S./U.K. alliance worked to obtain enough yes votes to pass
the measure. They hoped to convince France and Russia to abstain from voting on the measure
rather than vetoing the resolution authorizing military force. There were also political undertones
in the U.K. regarding the measure. Prime Minister Blair was facing a revolt by the British
Labour Party over the Iraq issue should the prime minister fail to obtain this second resolution
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from the U.N. authorizing military force. Within a week of this vote, it wasn’t clear if his
government could survive the popular sentiment by a growing number of U.K. citizens that
military action against Iraq by the U.S. and Britain was the right decision. However, despite
dissent among the general British populace, Blair was committed to his alliance with the U.S.
and prepared to go down with the ship if the British populace revolted. President George W.
Bush continued to try and win votes and influence Mexico and Chile to stand with the U.S. on
the Iraq issue but was unable to sway either leader into supporting the U.S. mission against
Iraq.241
The partnership between Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. President George W. Bush
would influence the design of the Coalition of the Willing. Blair told Bush that he would stand
by the U.S. in whatever manner was needed, but he asked for some things in return for being a
partner to military action in Iraq. On 28 July 2002, Blair urged Bush to gain traction on the
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), obtain U.N. authorization for the military action in Iraq, and
assist in shifting the public’s perception in the U.K., Europe, as well as the Arabian nations
before the U.K. could commit to coalition action. On 8 November 2002, the U.N. Security
Council unanimously passed resolution 1441. The resolution served as a final warning for
Hussein to disarm or suffer the repercussions. The U.N. weapons inspectors returned to Iraq later
the same month.242
When the U.N. Security Council failed to pass a resolution stating that Iraq had not
complied with resolution 1441 by December 2002, the U.S. and U.K. leaders, British civil
servant Sir John Chilcot argued, were “undermining the Security Council’s authority” by acting
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without the U.N.’s consent.243 The Chilcot Report, released in 2016, was responsible for
investigating Britain’s role in the invasion of Iraq. The U.N. represented the sole international
body that could authorize preventative military action on the basis of a failure to disarm
completely.244 Jonathan Powell, PM Blair’s Chief of Staff, told the British Chilcot Inquiry that
Blair wanted to partner with Bush to create a broad coalition of nations while encouraging the
U.S. to move in the direction the U.K. desired. With Blair’s influence, the Bush administration
did seek the second U.N. Security Council resolution, but Blair ultimately was not able to
influence the Washington decision-making apparatus to prevent unilateral military action in
Iraq.245 While the Bush administration tried to gain essential support in Europe, most European
citizens were strongly opposed to military action. When Blair approached Spain’s Prime
Minister José María Aznar about joining the coalition, Aznar stated that only four per cent of
Spaniards supported military action in Iraq. Despite this, Aznar declared that he would support
Blair and Bush because the threat of WMDs in Hussein’s hands was too severe to ignore. 246 The
Chilcot Report found that by December 2002, Bush had given up on weapons inspections to
yield the desired results, military action was the new plan going forward. 247 A more significant
bolstering to the coalition would come from Australia.
Australian Prime Minister John Howard wrote in his autobiography, Lazarus Rising, that
Australia’s partnership in the Coalition of the Willing, and committing ground troops to the
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invading force, was “the most controversial foreign affairs action of [his] Government.” 248
Australia committed three ships, a clearance diving team, and 500 special forces members with
three Chinook helicopters as part of the operation. 249 Howard raised the concern of the war
critics in his nation that the threat of terrorist retaliation against Australia would increase by
participating in the Iraqi invasion. Howard discards this criticism by noting that, seven years
after the invasion, intelligence reports showed that the nation of Australia had been a target of
terrorism by the al Qaeda terror network well before Howard authorized the support of the U.S.
mission as a member of the Coalition of the Willing. In addition, Australian citizens were killed
in a terrorist attack in Bali in October 2002, because of the nation’s prolonged involvement in
East Timor, in retaliation for the threat of Australians in separating Timor from the Islamic
world. The attack in Bali, which occurred five months before the invasion of Iraq, may have
operated as an event that further unified the nations of the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Australia as states threatened by terrorism in the modern era. 250
In his autobiography Howard declared that the Australian support for the operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq were executed as a unified response to the fight against global terrorism.
Howard conceded that Iraq did not have ties to al Qaeda or 11 September 2001, but the nation
was listed as a state sponsor of terror due to Hussein’s support for other terrorist groups during
his time in office. An example of how President Hussein supported terrorism was the reward
payment of $25,000 to the Palestinian families of suicide bombers who launched attacks in
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Israel. Howard maintains that the invasion of Iraq on 19 March 2003 was the right thing to do.
The U.S. was forced to act because of Iraq’s disregard for the U.N. resolutions.251 Although Iraq
had repeatedly violated U.N. Security Council Resolutions, the permanent members of the
security council had threatened to veto a resolution that called for military force for the state’s
failed disarmament ordered under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. Two permanent
members of the security council, Russia and France, let it be known that they would veto this
measure if it came to a vote. 252 Howard also believed that the intelligence presented at the time
did indicate that Hussein possessed WMDs that constituted a threat to the nations of the world.
Finally, Howard noted that the invasion could have been promoted as “anticipatory self-defense”
due to the threat of future terrorist partnerships with the rogue nation of Iraq, which had an
established history of regional aggression. 253 While Kuwait committed to staging troops for the
invasion of Iraq and the U.K. and Australia committed ground forces, other nations were not as
supportive of a military strike, typically due to the belief that diplomacy had not been given the
proper amount of time to solve the threat of perceived WMDs in Iraq.

Long-Term Allies that Opposed Invading Iraq: France
President George W. Bush put forth a yeoman’s effort in crafting the Coalition of the
Willing to support dethroning Hussein in Iraq. During this period of friendly influence, Bush
traveled extensively and sent members of his administration to nations that had friendly
diplomatic relationships with the U.S. and were key votes on the U.N. Security Council. French
President Jacques Chirac recalled one of these visits in his autobiography, My Life in Politics.
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The visit occurred on 27 May 2002, U.S. Memorial Day, and Chirac considered it an exceptional
visit as President Bush chose to celebrate the day on French soil. The visit was special because
the president held a ceremony on the beaches of Normandy to honor the memory of the
thousands of U.S. soldiers lost on that fateful beach landing in World War II. Bush's speech that
day was not merely commemorative but also a political discourse as he referred to terrorism and
the need for nations to stand against those who “hate freedom”. President Chirac spoke afterward
and stated that terrorism would not be tolerated but that all forms of prejudice must be
eliminated. Bush had just declared, in a private meeting with Chirac the previous day, that he had
no stronger ally than Chirac, and he considered him a close friend. 254
Despite Bush’s declaration of close friendship, Chirac warned Bush against launching a
military attack against Iraq, even though Chirac agreed that Hussein posed a threat to global
security. Chirac warned that although the initial strikes against Baghdad and Hussein would be
successful, as time wore on, there would be civil conflict among the Shi’ites, Kurds, and Sunnis
that call Iraq their homeland. Chirac’s concern regarding the possible invasion of Iraq grew when
his private chief of staff passed Chirac a note on 5 August 2002 reporting that a U.S. military
action against Iraq could occur before the year’s end. President Hussein was not oblivious that an
attack might occur and intelligence indicated that he was preparing defenses for a strike against
his nation. However, Bush’s plans for Iraq were not yet settled. The Pentagon had not decided
upon the strategy for the invasion or even how many members of the coalition forces would be
involved in the initial strike force. While the potential attack on Iraq seemed more and more
likely, world leaders like Chirac and Nelson Mandela expressed the grave concern that they
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shared.255 Mandela and Chirac agreed that the matter of Iraq was an issue of worry, and Mandela
physically grabbed Chirac, looked him in the eyes, and said: “You should do all you can to stop
Bush going into Iraq!”256
After meeting with Mandela in Johannesburg, Chirac warned that the weapons inspectors
needed to return to Iraq immediately. If Iraq opposed the weapons inspectors, then the only
legitimate agent to decide the repercussions was the U.N. Security Council, and the U.S. should
not act unilaterally. Because of France’s oppositional position, Prime Minister Blair telephoned
Chirac and discussed the issue of Iraq on 6 September 2002. Chirac reinforced his position that
the reintroduction of weapons inspectors was the priority. If there was resistance, the appropriate
pathway, in the eyes of France, was legitimate international action, and the stability of the region
must be a consideration. In this conversation between the leaders of France and the U.K., Blair
admitted to Chirac that he was in complete support of the U.S. perspective on Iraq and the most
effective way to stabilize the region was to remove Hussein from power. However, Blair also
told Chirac that he wanted to operate within the bounds of the U.N. and that it would have been
preferred that a second U.N. Security Council resolution to force Hussein to disarm was in
hand.257 U.S. House Republicans mocked the French status of opposition by naming French fries
“Freedom Fries” and French toast “Freedom Toast” in the House cafeterias. There doesn’t seem
to be much in the way of U.S. media opposition to French policy currently identified. 258 Blair

255

Chirac, My Life in Politics, pp. 303-304.
Chirac, My Life in Politics, p. 304.
257 Chirac, My Life in Politics, p. 305.
258 Sean Loughlin, “House Cafeterias Change Names for 'French' Fries and 'French' Toast,” CNN
(Cable News Network, March 12, 2003),
https://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/03/11/sprj.irq.fries/.
256

123

was not the only one to reach out to Chirac to push the French leader to align with the U.S.
position.
The same day as the conversation between Blair and Chirac occurred, Bush telephoned
Chirac. Chirac recalled that the Bush administration decided to inform several close allied
leaders about the current state of the plans for Iraq. Chirac noted in that conversation Bush spoke
as if he wasn’t committed to a “preemptive war” as was sought by Vice President Dick Cheney
and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and was tempered by the Secretary of State Colin
Powell’s reservations about the invasion. 259 The French Embassy in Washington, D.C. reported
to Chirac’s administration that Bush indeed had not decided on how best to approach the issue of
Iraq, despite the bellicose speech the president made to the West Point Military Academy’s
cadets three months prior. The next day would bring together two significant parties opposed to
the military action in Iraq.260
The day after Chirac spoke with President Bush by telephone, Chirac met with German
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in Hanover, Germany. Naturally, the topic of Iraq came up in a
discussion between the two leaders. Chirac recalled that the two agreed on numerous points and
four of these points were subsequently disclosed at a joint press conference. First, the two were
definitively opposed to any unilateral action in Iraq. Second, the two asserted that U.N. weapons
inspectors needed to return immediately to Iraq. Third, the pair made it clear that the U.N. should
play a pivotal role regarding Iraq. Finally, the U.N. objectives should not be changed and that the
weapons inspectors return without resorting to military action against Hussein and the nation.
Before the press conference concluded, Chancellor Schröder made it clear that Germany would
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play no part in an armed attack on Iraq. This was the only part in which the French and German
leaders differed because Chirac was not ready to make that claim. 261
However, it wouldn’t be long before Chirac clarified France’s position on the matter.
Chirac granted an interview to the New York Times, published on 9 September 2002. In the
interview, the topic of pre-emptive war and President Bush’s position on the matter arose. Chirac
dismissed the concept of pre-emption, stating:
From the moment a nation gives itself the right to act preemptively, other nations
will naturally do the same. That is, I believe, an extraordinarily dangerous
doctrine and one that could have dramatic consequences. A preemptive action
could be undertaken if it seems necessary, but only by the international
community, which is today the Security Council of the United Nations.262
With this statement, France stood alongside Germany in firm opposition to a pre-emptive,
unilateral attack by the United States. Despite decades of these two key U.S. allies siding with
the United States on critical issues and military conflicts in the latter portion of the twentieth
century, their opposition to the Bush administration’s goals for Iraq was a significant departure
from their relations with the hegemonic U.S.
In response to a question following this statement, Chirac stated that there was no
irrefutable proof that Hussein possessed WMDs at the time. Although he desired to see a change
in the Iraqi regime, there must be order in world affairs. Chirac also feared that should the Bush
administration launch a military invasion against Iraq, it may undermine any other international
coalition taking a stand against terrorism. Chirac used this engagement to urge other coalitions to
form against poverty and against climate change and to address other world issues. Chirac’s plan
for Iraq was to combine firmness and respect of current laws as an alternative to plans that Bush
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had proposed. This was three days before the Bush administration spoke of protecting lives while
seeking support from the U.N. Security Council in the form of a second resolution that PM Blair
had urged.263 Bush posed the question: “Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and
enforced or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its
founding or will it be irrelevant?”264 Interestingly, Bush questioned the purpose of the U.N. in
urging for the second resolution but then chose to undermine the institution by launching a
unilateral invasion of Iraq months later when the results of the U.N. weapons inspectors did not
definitively prove that Iraq had fully disarmed. However, France and Germany were not the only
key nations that the United States sought support from in the form of a second U.N. resolution.
President Chirac spoke with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Prime
Minister Zhu Rongji by phone after his phone conversation in October of 2002 with President
Bush. President Putin stated that the U.S. was putting extensive pressure on the Russian
Federation to support the U.S. and the U.K. in their aims for Iraq. President Putin asked for
President Chirac’s opinion on the text of the proposed resolution (the initial draft of resolution
1441). Putin had decided that the verbiage of immediate intervention in Iraq was not acceptable.
If France stood beside Putin on the issue, he was ready to veto the motion should the U.S. submit
the proposal. Chinese Prime Minister Rongji informed Chirac that he was willing to stand
alongside Putin and Chirac in the veto on the proposed motion in front of the Security
Council.265 The role of France in counterbalancing the United States’ urging for military action is
an integral part of understanding the foreign relations behind the Coalition of the Willing.
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When Bush realized that the idea of a second U.N. resolution was reaching the level of
crisis within 150 days of the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, it frustrated the
U.S. plans for invasion, but only temporarily. When the Bush administration recognized the
threat of a veto by France and Russia, both permanent members of the U.N. Security Council,
Bush chose to invade Iraq without the security council’s support. However, the conflict within
the U.N. regarding the Iraq invasion concerned U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who
worried about the future and relevance of the organization when faced with these current
difficulties. During the international conflict over Iraq and the proposed second resolution,
President Chirac attempted to secure the support of several non-permanent security council
members, such as Mexico, to support the weapons inspectors and disarmament instead of
unilateral military action in Iraq by the U.S. Despite the United States' ability to obtain NATO
support for the disarmament of Iraq, the approval was largely symbolic because the U.N. is the
organization for unified responses to conflict and disturbance within the international society and
the arbiter of conflict. By the end of January 2003, French Foreign Minister Dominique de
Villepin revealed that France was ready to veto a second U.N. Security Council Resolution
calling for immediate military interventions in the failed disarmament of Iraq. Bush stated that
should the second U.N. resolution fail, it would be due to France’s illegitimate blockage, but the
nations opposed to the military action viewed the U.S. as warmongers.266
When U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix delivered his report to the U.N. on 15 February
2003 stating that the weapons inspectors were making progress in verifying to what degree Iraq
had been disarmed, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin declared that military action
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in Iraq was not necessary and that the inspections were working. The declaration by de Villepin
was welcomed with applause by the attendees of the Security Council and inspired hope of a
peaceful resolution by the French, Russian, Chinese, and British governments. U.K. Foreign
Minister Jack Straw agreed with many when he stated that the weapons inspectors should be
given additional time to verify Iraq’s status of its purported CBW and WMD possession.267
Blix’s presentation and the response of the Security Council resulted in large-scale
antiwar protests within 48 hours in Britain, Spain, and Italy. Each of these countries had
supported the U.S. plans for Iraq, but many – if not the majority – of their citizens were against
military action. It seemed like the second U.N. Security Council resolution was very unlikely to
pass. Furthermore, France, Russia, and Germany worked together to craft a detailed disarmament
plan for Iraq that did not involve war. This alternative plan for Iraq was introduced to the U.N.
Security Council under the belief that the U.S. would not act against the council but there was no
further action taken on this proposal. When the U.K. and Spain demanded a twenty-four-hour
deadline for a U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing force in Iraq, France stood defiantly
against the proposed timeline, and the proposal was effectively killed. The result was an
ultimatum issued by Bush that President Hussein had forty-eight hours to leave Iraq or the U.S.
would launch an invasion.268 The story of France’s opposition to the U.S. is a major part of the
story of the Coalition of the Willing. Another longstanding United States ally, Germany, opposed
the military action in Iraq as well. The fact that Germany stood alongside France in the matter
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illustrates the difficulty they had in accepting the claims of the imminent threat that Iraq posed,
as well as their condemnation of war as a resolution to international conflicts.

Decades-Long Alliances that Opposed Invading Iraq: Germany
When German Foreign Minister Joseph Martin “Joschka” Fischer visited Washington,
D.C. on 18-19 September 2001, he learned that that the US considered Iraq a target against
terrorism from 11 September 2001—even before Germany had sent forces to Afghanistan in
response to the attacks of 9/11. Foreign Minister Fischer wrote for a German lecture on Kosovo
and Iraq that was later reprinted for the journal Bulletin of the German Historical Institute in
2007, of his concern that military action in Iraq at the time could result in a “new world war.” 269
Germany’s opposition to what would become a U.S. unilateral attack on the sovereign nation of
Iraq and the deposing of President Hussein from power marked a distinct departure from the
longstanding alliance between Germany and the United States. The opposition to the plans of the
Bush administration dominated the public debate throughout large parts of Europe (including
Germany) on the matter. On 22 January 2003, at the 40th-anniversary celebration of the FrancoGerman Treaty at Versailles, the leaders of France and Germany declared a unified opposition to
the use of any military force in Iraq. 270 The Bush administration declared that opposition to their
plans was “confrontational” and noted that Germany and France chose interesting allies with
Cuba and Libya as nations opposed to the U.S. pre-emptive action.271 France and Germany were
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ridiculed for their opposition to military action in Iraq by those nations that supported the
operation.272
While Germany contributed a considerable number of forces to the war in Afghanistan as
part of Operation Enduring Freedom, including 3,900 service members, they had defined the
limits of the area of responsibility that their troops could operate within. This area would not
include Iraq without the explicit consent of the German state. German Chancellor Schröder
asserted that many German citizens feared that unrestrained actions against Iraq would transform
into widespread violence between Islam and the collective West: “Germany is prepared to take
risks, including military risks, but not to engage in adventures.” 273 With this statement, Schröder
set the boundaries of what Germany would accept in order to participate in as part of the War on
Terror. Schröder’s memoirs recorded that when he spoke to Bush on 31 January 2002, the
German leader warned that the global fight against terrorism must follow the U.N. Security
Council’s guidelines of holding states accountable for harboring or protecting terrorist groups.
Germany would only support the United States when it operated within these guidelines. 274
Although Germany typically had fruitful relationships with U.S. presidents over several
decades, the country’s interactions turned cold rather quickly with the election of President
George W. Bush. At their first meeting on 29 March 2001, Schröder recalled that there were
unreconcilable differences in state policies and agendas from the beginning regarding the Kyoto
Protocol. The Bush administration was against the Kyoto Protocol because they believed it
would harm the U.S. economy. The state of affairs in Germany did not favor the use of military
force in general, and there was a feeling that German forces were already overextended by their
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deployments to Kosovo and Afghanistan. Notably, the German populace did not support German
troops deployed to Afghanistan. The division between Germany and the United States grew
when the Bush administration changed their National Security Strategy posture to allow for preemptive strikes against other nations if they posed an imminent threat to the U.S. 275
Germany and other European nations were unnerved by the new U.S. foreign policy of
pre-emption. They wondered how the United States would distinguish between acting in selfdefense versus outright aggressive attacks against other states. Schröder also identified the
precedent that a pre-emptive strike against Iraq would establish. He saw the possibility of China
striking against Taiwan based upon a declared pre-emptive threat. Schröder felt confident that
the narrow vote in the German Bundestag in favor of sending German troops to Afghanistan
would prevent a commitment of additional forces for military action in Iraq. When Bush visited
Berlin in May 2002, the U.S. president spoke to the Bundestag. He did not broach the subject of
a new war in Iraq, but there was a sizeable anti-Bush rally that required sealing-off half of the
city to protect the President. Schröder declared that he was committed to a close working
relationship and solidarity against terrorist threats. Bush and his staff left Germany believing that
Schröder and Germany were on their side regarding Iraq, because Schröeder and Bush agreed to
continue to consult about Iraq and Germany agreed not to stand in the way of the invasion, so
long as it didn’t interfere in Germany’s elections. However, Schröder’s memoirs indicated that
Germany would side with the U.S. if it turned out that Iraq was harboring terrorists, but at this
time, there was no substantive proof to confirm such an assertion. 276
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It would not take long before the issue of Iraq entered the conversation during the
German election season, and Schröder was forced to distance Germany from the looming
conflict, which left Bush feeling betrayed. Schröder was committed to the War on Terror but was
antipathetic towards including Iraq in this grouping without proof. This positioning by the
German administration had much to do with the feeling of the majority of the German populace.
A poll conducted by Der Spiegel in August 2002 revealed that fifty-one per cent of those polled
believed that Germany should not be involved in an Iraq invasion in any way. Public opinion
experts asserted, based upon other polling data within Germany, that approximately eighty per
cent of Germans were against the U.S.-led Iraqi invasion. Chancellor Schröder and Foreign
Minister Fischer decided that to continue as political leaders, they had to declare that Germany
would not play a part in Iraq. 277
Schröder cited four specific reasons Germany was against military action in Iraq, which
he revealed in a New York Times interview on 5 September 2002. First, Schröder believed that
the isolation and containment of President Hussein in Iraq was already successful. The proper
diplomatic and economic policies would get Iraq to open the doors once again to U.N. weapons
inspectors to facilitate disarmament. However, Schröder felt that the U.S. was willing to go to
war against Iraq, regardless of what the weapons inspectors found, and because of this, he felt
that U.S. allies’ concerns were being ignored. Second, Schröder was concerned about the
region's stability if the U.S. invaded Iraq and did not have a solid plan to establish security as
part of the ousting of Hussein. Third, Schröder felt that the economic repercussions of such an
invasion had not been considered thoroughly. Finally, Schröder argued that without more
significant progress in the war in Afghanistan, a military invasion in Iraq might spur the growth
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of terrorist networks and encourage further terrorist attacks, which seemed counterproductive in
a War on Terror.278
Because of the reasons given in the New York Times article and the clear desire to
preserve his elected position, Germany said “No” to partnering with the U.S. in its efforts in Iraq
in 2003. The political aspect was important to Schröder, who was aware that an additional vote
by the governing coalition in favor of military action in Iraq was impossible. Schröder was also
aware that the Party of Democratic Socialism that opposed him would benefit greatly should
Schröder support the United States. Further splintering within the German political parties would
have been likely had Schröder and Fischer signed on with the Coalition of the Willing. Despite
the political reasons for standing against the war in Iraq, Germany’s intelligence community
passed on information from an Iraqi defector. 279
The Iraqi defector that provided intelligence to Germany was Rafid Ahmed Alwan alJanabi codenamed “Curveball” for some unknown reason. Curveball sought to deliver damning
information about President Hussein and WMDs to the West in exchange for asylum in
Germany. German intelligence found the information very dubious and questioned why the
defector seemed to be pushing for war against Iraq. Curveball’s information was the main source
of the claim that Iraq had mobile weapons laboratories to develop nuclear weapons and WMDs.
When the German intelligence services shared the information with the United States, they did
warn that the source was questionable and required further verification. Despite the warnings of
the German intelligence services about Curveball and the information that he presented, the

Steven Erlanger, “German Leader's Warning: War Plan Is a Huge Mistake,” The New York
Times (The New York Times, September 5, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/05/world/traces-of-terror-perspectives-german-leader-swarning-war-plan-is-a-huge-mistake.html.
279 Dettke, Germany Says "No,” p. 163.
278

133

intelligence was reported to international communities as reliable in the eyes of the U.S. Colin
Powell’s 5 February 2003 address to the U.N. Security Council cited this intelligence as further
justification of the need to remove Hussein from power through an invasion of Iraq. 280
This was not the end of the involvement of Germany in the discussion of an invasion of
Iraq. When U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney spoke before the Veterans of Foreign Wars on 27
August 2002 in Nashville, Tennessee, he delivered an ominous line. VP Cheney stated that,
regarding Iraq, “the risks of inaction are far greater than the risks of action.” 281 Approximately
one month before VP Cheney’s speech, leaders at a French-German summit in Schwerin,
Germany (the small group included French President Chirac, German Chancellor Schröder,
Joschka Fischer, and Dieter Kastrup) decided unanimously that France and Germany must make
a public, forcible stance against the United States and Bush’s plan to invade Iraq. According to
German policy expert, Professor Dieter Dettke, this meant that Germany was the leader of the
opposition coalition in Europe, and France must consider this in further foreign policy issues. As
a result of this agreement between the French and German leaders, both Chirac and Schröder
made public statements. Schröder stated that the U.S. government had failed to consult with
Germany before a decision on an invasion of Iraq. Chirac urged the Iraqi government to accept
the U.N. secretary-general’s proposals of removing the embargo of Iraq in exchange for the
reintroduction of U.N. weapons inspectors. Schröder indicated that he was aware of the impact
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Germany’s “No” against the U.S. would have on future international relations and foreign policy.
Still, the stakes were too high to ignore the threat to all nations. 282

Conclusion
Although it might seem that it would have been simpler to assassinate President Hussein
and institute a democratic system in Iraq than launching the invasion that transpired in 2003,
there were many reasons the U.S. did not pursue a regime change in this manner. Dismissing an
assassination attempt against President Hussein, the planning for a military attack against the
nation of Iraq required coordination and cooperation among states. Though the U.S. quickly
developed a coalition to target Afghanistan as a nation that harbored the terror network al Qaeda,
responsible for the attacks on 9/11, coordinating a second Coalition of the Willing that supported
an invasion of Iraq was not as easy. Although most of the international community desired to see
President Hussein disarmed, they were not all supportive of military action to achieve those ends.
As President George W. Bush approached U.S. allies about the possible military action, he found
that U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair would become his strongest ally in the mission in Iraq. I
speculate that the partnership by Blair may have been done to show the British strength in the
worldwide arena and posture to regain some of its lost hegemonic power after World War II.
Unfortunately for Blair, the legacy of Iraq and the black eye from misrepresented intelligence led
to a failure in President Bush’s goals for the country. Iraq did more harm than good for Blair and
the U.K.’s power and prestige on the global stage.
However, having Blair as a stalwart ally likely resulted in Australia signing on to the
Bush administration’s new war. Although Australia committed significantly fewer troops to the
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invasion compared to the United States and the United Kingdom, its participation represented a
broader international coalition aimed at ousting Hussein and gave further support to a
transnational partnership in the new front in the War on Terror. Although President Bush gained
the alliance of PM Blair and PM Howard for the invasion of Iraq on 19 March 2003, the invasion
did not occur without considerable opposition by two longstanding U.S. allies, France and
Germany. French President Chirac was not in favor of military action in Iraq and instead urged
for weapons inspectors to return to Iraq to enable proper disarmament of Hussein. Chirac
coordinated with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and the two decided that they were both
against a pre-emptive, or more accurately a preventative, war in Iraq and stood as pillars against
Bush. Chirac stated unequivocally that the lack of irrefutable evidence proving that President
Hussein had WMDs was disquieting.
Further research into the members of the Coalition of the Willing would reveal all of the
members that supported the invasion of Iraq through their commitments of military members,
arms, intelligence, financing, and military staging. It would be interesting to know the reasons
why some nations that did commit to supporting the effort asked not to have their support
disclosed. In the case of Israel, their overt support may have not occurred out of a fear of
reprisals of further terror attacks against Israelis by Palestinians or Muslim extremists from other
nations. Further investigation into how the participation in the Coalition of the Willing, or its
opposition, affected long-term foreign relations between the United States and the nations of
Britain, Australia, France, and Germany is needed. Beyond military alliances, what other types
of support, such as support in the international community and other treaties, were altered?
Analysis on the domestic politics of coalition supporters and those in opposition may reveal
interesting repercussions for their stance regarding the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Also, it would be
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interesting to see how world leader’s legacies were impacted, positively or negatively, for their
position on the Iraq War.
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Thesis Conclusion
The information in this thesis supports my argument that the attacks of 11 September
2001 facilitated foreign policy changes in the U.S. that opened the door for a unilateral invasion
of Iraq in 2003 based upon misrepresented intelligence. By not presenting the complete picture
of the intelligence regarding Iraq, U.S. citizens and those abroad only received talking points
supporting President Bush’s assertion of the imminent threat posed by President Hussein, which
the facts did not support. The roadmap to the invasion of Iraq has been addressed in this thesis,
beginning with the background of other past presidents’ use of “pre-emption” and how they
responded to terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its interests worldwide.
Chapter One detailed the important publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy of
the United States. The relevant section of this government publication stated that the U.S. would
take pre-emptive action against terrorists and that the Bush administration would act unilaterally
if necessary. Although the publication stated that the nation would take pre-emptive action in the
face of an imminent threat, realistically, the U.S. was preparing for a preventative attack against
any perceived threat. Specifically, the target that they had in mind was the sovereign nation of
Iraq, which the Bush administration contended held WMDs. In the aftermath of 9/11 President
Bush actively sought to connect Iraq to the terrorist attacks so that the government could update
and validate a prior plan to oust Hussein. When the Bush administration refused to exhaust all
diplomatic measures to assure the complete disarmament of Iraq by utilizing U.N. weapons
inspectors, they made it clear that they would no longer wait for a threat to materialize in the
form of a mushroom cloud on the horizon. 283
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With the failure of the U.S. and Britain to obtain a second security council resolution
authorizing war in Iraq the legality of the invasion was called to question by legal scholars. An
examination on the limited scholarly writing on this matter points to the largely agreed upon
conclusion that the invasion was illegal in the eyes of international law. The outlier of this group
is legal scholar John Yoo who contended that, based upon precedent and his interpretation of the
U.N Charter and selected resolutions, the invasion was legal. However, as was noted in the
chapter, it is important to recognize Yoo’s bias as a former member of the Bush administration at
the heart of the matter. Furthermore, Yoo’s article was published shortly after the invasion of
Iraq, which indicates that his opinion was likely largely shaped by his position on President
Bush’s staff. Notably, the U.N. Secretary General at the time, Kofi Annan, later repeatedly
stressed that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was illegal. The invasion undermined the authority and
credibility of the U.N. as although the invasion was labeled as illegal, the U.S. faced no sanctions
or tangible repercussions for the military action.
A final piece worth reiterating from the first chapter is the role of the United States as
world hegemon. The U.S. become the unipolar hegemon following the end of the Cold War. Its
hegemonic position was reinforced by the 9/11 attacks and led to the U.S. declaring a War on
Terror. By instituting this War on Terror, the Bush administration built upon the fear in U.S.
citizens that another attack was likely, and all sources of terrorism needed to be addressed to
maintain national safety. By implicitly linking Hussein to the 9/11 attacks, Bush argued that Iraq
was the next target after launching a war with Afghanistan to deal with al Qaeda and the Taliban
government that allowed them to operate within its borders. Interestingly, the position of the U.S.
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as hegemon at that time was not carried forth by most Democrats but was largely a Republican
party endeavor. Although the hegemon carried out wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, they left both
countries largely destabilized.
Chapter Two examined the role of the mainstream media in uncritically repeating the
claims of the Bush administration in building support for the invasion of Iraq. The terrorist
attacks on 9/11 provided the mainstream media with countless hours of coverage of the attacks,
the perpetrators, and the planned U.S. response. In hindsight, their nonstop coverage may have
promoted terrorism and fostered greater fear in the U.S. citizenry. The coverage of President
Bush’s speeches as early as 12 September 2001 reinforced his talking points as Iraq being
connected to terrorism and WMDs.284
Also, in this chapter, I showed how other government agencies, namely the Department
of State, were used to bolster support in other nations for the U.S. plan for war. This was done to
try and sway countries into joining President Bush’s Coalition of the Willing as well as build
support among citizens of other nations. Proof of these objectives was revealed in declassified
cables between the U.S. government and its embassies not readily available or written upon to
the best of my knowledge. Although sections of these cables remain redacted, like all other
documents that I obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and government portals, they
depict a complex network within the U.S. government looking to build support for the invasion
of Iraq.
Chapter Three detailed the complications that President Bush had in assembling his
Coalition of the Willing. As important as his partnership with Britain was in the execution of the
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invasion, the two long-standing allied countries of France and Germany chose not to participate.
The fact that these two allies opposed the invasion is important in understanding that the
invasion was not supported by all U.S. partners and their distancing from the action in Iraq
represented the potential difficulties that the Bush administration would face in attempting to
obtain a second U.N. resolution authorizing war. Because of this, the U.S. chose unilateral action
in Iraq. However, all through this march to war, it should not be forgotten that the U.S. was
cherry-picking and misconstruing intelligence reports to push the nation towards war and the
ousting of President Hussein.
Further investigation of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 would be beneficial for the study of
this contemporary event. Oral histories along the timeline of discussing the ousting of Hussein
would be useful if other members of the Bush administration or military leaders on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff were willing to go on the record with their understanding of the unfolding of the
event. I requested interviews with different government leaders (e.g., President Bush) and
military officials that were part of the planning process (e.g. Admiral Michael Franken), but all
requests went unanswered. Hopefully, as time progresses further information will become
available from government agencies in the form of less redacted documents or new documents
not previously released. However, it could be decades before those records become available. A
detailed analysis of the IAEA records could prove useful in revealing what exactly was known
about Iraq’s weapons program and when it was discovered. A detailed analysis of the differences
of intelligence reports between the U.S., U.K., and other nations such as Germany could provide
a better picture of the disparity between what was believed to be true and what was presented by
President Bush in support of the invasion.
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I believe that one thing that the invasion of Iraq demonstrates is that some government
leaders have agendas going into office that might skew their perception of facts. Regarding
President Bush and Iraq, the president and many in the U.S. government viewed Iraq as a threat
and unfortunately the events of 9/11 provided Bush an opening to oust Hussein. However, it is
important to note that this is not simply because he was a Republican. Democrats as a whole are
no more of a pacifist than a Republican leader. Proof of this is how previous and subsequent
presidents have responded to terrorist threats against U.S. interests as well as their declared
foreign policies laid out in their National Security Strategies. The events in Iraq and Afghanistan
resulted in a transformation of the military post-9/11 in dealing with terrorism and insurgencies
in military planning within areas of operation. Some examples of this transformation have been
documented in essays by senior military leadership at the military war colleges.
U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Graves wrote that after Operation Desert
Storm in the 1990s, most nations of the world did not possess a military force that could defeat
the U.S. in conventional warfare. While the traditional U.S. military was considered by some
military scholars, like Senior Defense Analyst Stephen Biddle, to be a “heavy, slow-moving,
Cold War relic into a leaner, faster, higher-technology force that exploits the connectivity of
networked information to outmaneuver, outrange, and demoralize enemy forces without
requiring their piecemeal destruction in close combat,” changes were made to make it more
flexible and quicker to react. 285 After 9/11 the terrorist group al Qaeda demonstrated that they did
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not need to meet the U.S. coalition military forces on the battlefield but were able to utilize
information technology to stay ahead of the enemy. When the U.S. faced this revolution of
military combat it instigated Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in 2002, to change military
capabilities and how the U.S. thought about war beyond evolutionary warfighting technology. 286
As a reaction to the terrorist groups like al Qaeda, the U.S. military restructured the
armed forces to be more flexible and adaptable to varying threats. The U.S. Army changed the
structure of its force to have faster deployment at the tactical level with bolstered intelligence
capabilities. Beyond the military response to terrorist groups, the U.S. government developed the
Department of Homeland Security and consolidated other agencies such as the Coast Guard and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency with the aim of preventing future attacks by
weaving together the strengths and skills of each agency. This reflected a realization that
civilians in the private sector are a critical tool in shaping the future response to terrorism. 287
Similarly, the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-37.2 Terrorism explains that counterterrorism actions
executed by the U.S. military includes strikes and raids by special operations forces, to which the
greater Army forces may contribute support. The same Army Field Manual details the measures
that Antiterrorism Officers and Commanders are to use against terrorism through Security
Cooperation, Limited Operation, Peace Operations, Irregular Warfare, and Major Combat
Operations. At each level, the Army explains how each of these categories is supported through
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joint military involvement, civil military operations, and the development of stable governments
recognized by the local populace. This field manual, released in 2011, demonstrated lessons
learned from failed experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq in combatting terrorism.288
In addition to terrorism, the U.S. military regularly encountered insurgency efforts in the
wars of Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel James F. Glynn argued that
the adaptability of insurgencies resulted in armed forces failing to effectively fight them, leading
to an increase in the popularity of this type of warfare. However, it should be noted that
insurgent warfare is not new as it existed since the U.S. Colonial Army and abroad in the wars
against Napoleon from the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century. Political power is the key
factor that insurgencies and counterinsurgencies vie for to build support from the populace as the
legitimate authority to govern. 289 The U.S. Army FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering
Insurgencies argued that all branches of the U.S. military are necessary in executing
counterinsurgency efforts. U.S. counterinsurgency missions operate a shape-clear-hold-buildtransition framework with the goal of empowering host-nation capabilities for the transition of
responsibilities. The shape phase clears the way by altering the environment to allow for the
clearing phase to remove insurgents from an area. The hold phase builds security within the
geographic area and making the return of insurgents difficult. The build phase increases security
in the area to allow for local control. The transition phase occurs when the security of the area is
transferred to local and governmental forces. The execution of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines
in fighting insurgent forces relies upon traditional large-scale U.S. forces that are flexible and
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allow for the shape-clear-hold-build-transition to occur in a responsive manner that may result in
moving backwards a step to combat insurgencies. 290
The adaptation to encountering terrorism and insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan did
not mean that traditional warfighting by the U.S. military was irrelevant. Military leaders
recognized that in addition to their traditional operations, they needed written guidance in
fighting terrorists and insurgents. The two field manuals referenced above, and used to train
military officers, do not depict strict guidance on how to react to these threats with general
guidance from senior military leadership. The manner in which the U.S. military fights terrorism
in the modern age recognizes the importance of other governmental agencies and the “winning of
hearts and minds” through capacity building and deterrence from terrorist actions by providing
for the basic needs of people that may be susceptible to terrorist recruiting. The manner in which
U.S. military civil affairs operators work to win this fight is through the building of schools,
clinics, and hospitals in disadvantaged areas. These activities are conducted not just in the
Middle East but also throughout nations on the African continent where terrorist networks have a
known presence. According to the U.S. Army, civil affairs specialists regularly demonstrate their
value in the grander scheme of military campaigns in the modern era, including in Operation
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. In Iraq, civil affairs specialists were credited
with the understanding of Sunni grievances that were part of the Sunni Awakening of 2006 that
resulted in the defeat of al Qaeda in the country thereafter. Civil affairs specialists in the U.S.
Army and U.S. Navy contribute to the commander’s understanding of the operational
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environment and gain the knowledge of critical infrastructure in the area of operations. This
knowledge is also provided to interagency partners and other stakeholders to meet the U.S.
military objectives without risking damage to protected targets (e.g. places of worship, schools,
and medical facilities).291
Regarding the issue of precedent setting in Iraq with the U.S. launching a pre-emptive
strike, there happens to have been a war recently launched by Russia against Ukraine on 24
February 2022. On 9 May 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that the invasion of
Ukraine was a pre-emptive move against potential aggression.292 Interestingly, the fact that Putin
cited potential aggression by Ukraine is more correctly described as a preventive attack, identical
to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Although Putin would likely give a justification for the invasion
that might ameliorate the criticism of the action by other nations, it is notable that Putin used the
same reasoning as President Bush used decades earlier. Putin claimed that the military
development of adjacent nations posed an inevitable threat to Russia. 293 While the U.S. has
contributed financially and with the transfer of arms, they were careful, at the time of this
writing, to keep from being directly involved with the war by steering clear of establishing a nofly zone which would make them an official enemy of Russia. While President Joe Biden has not
spoken about Putin’s pre-emption explanation for the war it is likely that it prompted others to
recall the use of the term in justifying the Iraqi invasion. Further study of the Russia-Ukraine
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War by future scholars may provide a more detailed analysis of the pre-emption explanation and
parallels to the Iraq War.
The study of the contemporary events in the lead-up to and execution to the Iraq War
remains unfinished but this thesis provides a groundwork for future study. President Bush’s
adventures in Iraq marred his legacy but may not be an anomaly in 21st century warfare as the
previously mentioned Russian-Ukraine War indicates. The excuse of launching a pre-emptive
attack to hinder a future attack seems to no longer require that a threat be imminent but merely
be explained as preventing a future threat. The fact that the U.S. faced no sanctions by the U.N.
nor economic difficulties with other nations following the Iraq War shows that nations that hold
a veto on the U.N. Security Council may operate with seeming impunity. The study of
contemporary events like Iraq provides a lens with which to view other contemporary events as
they develop and allows for comparison and contrasting views of other significant events in the
modern era. This thesis only examined the early parts of the Iraqi invasion but further study and
evaluation of the rest of the war and the manner in which the nation was left after the U.S.
withdrawal would give greater understanding to a significant period of conflict involving the
United States.
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